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Cartel Office, its application of the substantive merger control rules, andpos-
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While the prohibition of mergers and acquisitions to prevent un-
due market concentration is a mature legal concept in the United States
based on section 7 of the Clayton Act, ' merger control in Europe is for
the most part in the embryonic or adolescent stages with Germany
leading the way. At the supranational level, the European Economic
Community (EEC) has no general merger control statute and therefore
has a very limited capability to prohibit anticompetitive mergers.2 At
the national level, only Britain 3 France,4 and Germany5 have laws spe-
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
2 Mergers may be attacked under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides in part
that an "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as
it may affect trade between Member States." Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, March 25, 1957, 295 U.N.T.S. 2. Mergers may be prohibited only to the extent "an under-
taking in a dominant position stregthens that dominant position so that the degree of control
achieved substantially obstructs competition, i.e. so that the only undertakings left in the market
are those which are dependent on the dominant undertaking with regard to their market beha-
viour." Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co., Inc. P. EEC Commission, COMM. MKT.
L.R. 199, 225 (1973).
While article 86 has not yet been used with success to block mergers, article 85 has been
applied successfully to attack joint ventures. This article prohibits "agreements between under-
takings . . . which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market ....
See Re Bayer Gist-Brocades, Comm. Mkt. L.R. D98 (1976); SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY, §§ 53-59 (1976); C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION,
345-57 (1978); Huber, Aktuelle Probleme des Gemeinschaftsunternehmens im deutschen und
europaischen Wettbewerbsrecht, 28 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETrBEWERB 677 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as WuW]; Steindorff, Zur Anwendbarkeit des Art. 85,4bs. 1 EWG- Verfrag auf Gemeinschaftsun-
ternehmen in der EG-Praxis, 32 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1613 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BB]. For
discussion of the relationship between articles 85-86 and article 23, § 1, of the Free Trade Agree-
ments between the EEC and the member states of the European Trade Association (EFTA), see
Roth, Die Wettbewerbsregeln in den Freihandelsabkommen der EWG, 1978 WETTBEWERB IN
RECHT UND PRAXIs 409 [hereinafter cited as WRP]. Article 66(1) of the European Coal and Steel
Treaty provides for control over mergers in which one of the merging parties is a producer of coal
or steel but has been rarely applied.
A proposed regulation for the general control of mergers in the EEC dated July 20, 1973,
provides in part: "Any transaction which has the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a
concentration between undertakings or groups of undertakings, at least one of which is established
in the common market, whereby they acquire or enhance the power to hinder effective competi-
tion in the common market or in a substantial part thereof, is incompatible with the common
market in so far as the concentration may affect trade between Member States." 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (no. c 92) 2 (1973); COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA, vol. A*, at
CM.L.II-91 (D. Gjilstra & F. Murphy ed. 1977). Prospects of the Council adopting this proposed
regulation in the near future are considered highly unlikely.
3 Merger control was enacted in Britain in the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, c. 50,
amended by The Fair Trading Act 1973, c. 41. See COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE USA, vol. A*, at UK.L.l-5. An overview of merger control laws of many countries is found
in OECD, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 77-
82 (1978).
4 A merger control law was enacted in France in 1977. Loi No. 77-806, July 19, 1977, [1977]
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cially directed at the control of mergers.
The German merger control statute is found in sections 22-24a of
the Law Against Restraints of Competition, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschrdnkungen (GWB). Adopted in 1973 as an amendment to the
GWB, which dates from 1957,6 the merger control provisions consist of
two main bodies of law: a reporting system under sections 23 and 24a
GWB, and the substantive law under sections 22 and 24 GWB. The act
seeks to maintain market structures that make effective competition
possible by prohibiting the creation or entrenchment of market power
which is likely to harm the competitive process and its accompanying
economic efficiencies. The fundamental principle is that the creation or
strengthening of a market dominating position is to be prohibited
whether or not that market power will actually be used to restrain com-
petition.7
The reporting provisions as well as the substantive merger prohibi-
tions of the German law may have significant implications for mergers
involving American firms if they have a business connection with Ger-
many. The following discussion of German merger control is therefore
written particularly to provide information about the application of the
German statute to such mergers and to enable American practitioners
to file simple reports of mergers with the German Cartel Office as re-
quired by law. An examination of the German law is also of compara-
tive law interest because it may provide a model for the further
development of merger control in the EEC and the United States. Part
I of the article presents an overview of the different reporting require-
ments for planned and consummated mergers. Part II is dedicated to
J.O. 3833; D6cret No. 77-1189, Oct. 25, 1977, [1977] J.O. 5223. It is only applicable to horizontal
mergers resulting in a 40% market share and vertical and conglomerate mergers involving a 25%
market share. Such mergers may be justified on competition grounds or the furtherance of eco-
nomic and social progress, including the international competitiveness of the participating enter-
prises. For a discussion of the law, see Brault, Current Developments in Competition Policies, 22
ANTITRUST BULL. 157 (1977); Grauel, Dasfranzesische Kartellgesetz yom 19. Juli 1977, 28 WuW
751 (1978); Jeantet, Loi sur le contrble des concentrations conomiques en France, LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 2879, I Doctrine (1977).
5 Second Amendment to the Law Against Restraints of Competition of August 4, 1973, [1973]
BGBI I. 917.
6 The Law Against Restraints of Competition, enacted on July 27, 1957, became effective on
January 1, 1958. [1957] BGB1 I. 1081. It superceded the decartelization laws that were intro-
duced by the American, British, and French military governments after World War II. The
merger control provisions, introduced in the Second Amendment, note 5 supra, had retroactive
effect to June 7, 1973. Other minor amendments relating to application of merger control to the
press were made in the Third Amendment of June 28, 1976. [1976] BGB1 I. 1697. The full text of
22-24a of GWB is found in Appendix I.
7 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 115-16, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1506-07 (1978).
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the substantive merger law. Part III suggests some ideas concerning the
extraterritorial application of the law. Finally, Part IV describes and
comments upon the first two German Supreme Court cases delivered in
1978 which interpreted the principles of the law in such difficult areas
as conglomerate mergers and joint-ventures.
I. THE REPORTING SYSTEM
A. Fundamentals
The complicated statutory provisions for reporting mergers above
a certain size or market share to the Cartel Office are found in two
separate but related provisions, partly for historical reasons and partly
because of different purposes. Section 23 GWB requires the reporting
of certain consummated mergers. Section 24a GWB provides for com-
pulsory and voluntary notification of planned mergers.
The reporting requirement for consummated mergers under sec-
tion 23 was enacted before the Cartel Office had authority to prohibit
mergers with two informational purposes in mind.8 First, the Cartel
Office was to be given notice of large mergers that might result in a
dominant market position triggering enforcement of sections 22(4) and
(5), which provide the Cartel Office with special authority over abusive
conduct by market dominating enterprises. Second, the reporting of all
important mergers to the Cartel Office would enable it to have a contin-
uous overall picture of the concentration movement in German indus-
try. Statistical experience based on this reporting system influenced, in
part, the adoption of the 1973 merger control provisions.9 While these
legislative purposes of former section 23 are still valid today, they are
now supplemented by the central purpose of alerting the Cartel Office
to mergers at the time of consummation in order to facilitate their prohi-
bition by administrative order of the Cartel Office if they are illegal
under section 24. Application of this substantive merger control provi-
sion, however, is not dependent on the reporting requirements under
either sections 23 or 24a, but rather can be applied whenever the Cartel
Office becomes aware of a merger by whatever means.'0 The owners or
8 FRANFURTER KOMMENTAR § 23, 1 18-19 [hereinafter cited as FK].
9 Keuensfichnahmaschienen, - BGHZ -, WuW/E BGH 1570, 1575-76 (1979).
BEGRUNDUNG ZUM REGIERUNGSENTWURF VOM 18.8.71 (Explanation of the Government's Pro-
posed Law of August 18, 197 1), BT-Drucks. VI/2520; BR-Drucks. 265/71, §§ 16-18 [hereinafter
cited as GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION]. Relevant portions are found in Appendix II of W.
KLEINMANN & R. BECHTOLD, KOMMENTAR ZUR FUSIONSKONTROLLE (1977) [hereinafter cited as
KB].
10 FK § 24, 76; E. LANGEN, E. NIEDERLEITHINGER, & U. SCHMIDT, KOMMENTAR ZUM
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other legal representatives obligated to make the report for the partici-
pating enterprises must provide the report without undue delay after
consummation of the merger. If the merging enterprises provide a re-
port without undue delay, then a statutory time limitation of one year
is triggered within which the Cartel Office must determine whether to
prohibit the merger." I This one year period upholds the interest of the
merging enterprises in legal certainty so that business planning can go
forward without eventual later prohibition of the merger.
The pre-merger notification provisions of section 24a require noti-
fication of aplanned merger before consummation between very large
enterprises. 12 The purpose of this rule is to make it possible for the
Cartel Office to conduct an investigation at the earliest possible time of
mergers between very large enterprises, as such giant marriages can
cause very serious and long term deterioration of market structures and
present particularly difficult problems of divestiture.' 3 These large-firm
mergers requiring pre-merger notification to the Cartel Office are gov-
erned by two important rules. First, the consummation of such a
merger is preliminarily prohibited under section 24a until the Cartel
Office reaches a decision on the legality, of the merger, while this is not
the case under the reporting provisions of section 23. This means that
any legal actions taken to consummate large mergers are ineffective
under civil law, pending decision by the Cartel Office. 14 Second, the
Cartel Office is bound by a time limitation once complete notification is
made under section 24a. Rather than a one year period being imposed,
as under the reporting provisions of section 23, the notification provi-
sions of section 24a trigger a four-month period within which the Car-
tel Office must determine whether to prohibit the merger. Upon
expiration of this period, the Cartel Office may prohibit mergers in only
a few exceptional circumstances.' 5
The pre-merger notification provisions under section 24a further
KARTELLGESETZ § 23, 60 (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LNS KOMMENTAR]. Other recently
published commentaries on German merger control are found in H. EBEL, KARTELLRECHTSKOM-
MENTAR at §§ 23-24a; Emmerich, Die bisherige Praxis mr Fusionskontrolle: Eine kritische 4nalyse,
1978 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 85, 118; H. Mi6LLER, P. GIESSLER & U. SciioLz, KOMMENTAR
ZUM GEsEz GEGEN WETrBEWERBSBESCHR.ANKUNGEN (KARTELLGESETZ) §§ 23-24a (1978); K.
WESTRICK AND U. LOEWENHEIM, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN: KoM-
MENTAR §§ 23-24a (1978).
11 GWB §24(2); KB § 24, 138; FK § 24, 78.
12 GWB § 24a(1).
13 KB Einl. 18.
14 GWB § 24a(4); KB § 24a, 99; Weichshaum III, WuW/E BGH 1556, 1557 (1978); Mfeizeler
Schaum, WuW/E 1547 (1978).
15 GWB § 24a(2).
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provide for voluntary notification of smaller mergers which may or
may not be subject to the reporting requirements of section 23. Those
mergers are valid under civil law when consummated. The primary
incentives for voluntary notification are avoidance of later divestiture
proceedings and a quicker decision by the Cartel Office on the legality
of the merger. 1
6
With the different concepts of reporting under section 23 and pre-
merger notification under section 24a in mind, these provisions can
now be examined individually.
B. Reporting a Merger Under Section 23 GWB
The fundamental purpose of section 23 is to provide the Cartel
Office with information needed to follow all significant merger activity.
Its detailed provisions define the term merger, tell which mergers based
on market share and size criteria must be reported, and prescribe the
content of the report.
-/ Denition of Merger
The term merger is defined in section 23 (2) by four specific
merger categories plus a fifth catch-all clause: (1) acquisition of assets
and liabilities in whole or substantial part, 7 (2) acquisition of stock, (3)
agreements resulting in or enlarging a combine (Konzern) under which
one enterprise obligates itself to conduct its business for the account of
another or transfer its profits to another, or the lease or transfer of a
substantial part of a business, (4) identity of at least half of the mem-
bership of the governing board or management, and (5) any other rela-
tionship on the basis of which control of another enterprise is gained.
The merger must occur between "enterprises" (Unternehmen) under
German law, which may be defined as all natural and legal persons
actively engaging in business activity as opposed to private consum-
ers. 18
Since stock acquisitions are the largest category of mergers re-
ported to the Cartel Office, a closer look at the provisions relating to
16 GWB § 24a(l); KB § 24a, 37.
17 In Kettenstichnahmaschinen, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1570, 1576 (1979), the Supreme
Court decided that the conglomerate acquisition of only minor assets which may nevertheless
have represented over 20% of a market for industrial back-stitch sewing machines could be con-
sidered a "substantial part" of the acquiree's business and thus subject to the reporting require-
ment under § 23(2)(1). A report is required if the conglomerate merger is likely to have any
perceptible effect on a relevant market. The absolute size of the acquired assets, their value,
number of employees, turnover, or market shares are not determinative alone.




this form of acquisition is appropriate.' 9 The acquisition of stock in
another enterprise is deemed to be a merger when any of three levels of
participation is reached: (1) acquisition of 25% of the voting capital, (2)
acquisition of 50% of the voting capital, or (3) majority interest within
the meaning of section 16(1) of the Stock Corporation Act.20 An im-
portant aspect of this definition is that according to the first two alter-
natives, only the acquisition of voting capital is deemed to be a merger,
while the third alternative relates to "majority interest" within the
meaning of the Stock Corporation Act, which can be either a majority
of voting rights or a majority of shares.2 In practice, the critical
threshold most frequently exceeded is 25% of the voting capital.
Of course, the failure to acquire enough shares to meet these for-
mal rules on the level of stock participation does not free one from the
duty to report a merger to the Cartel Office if the acquisition activity
falls into one of the other four major categories, particularly the last
alternative, which looks to whether "one or several enterprises are able
directly or indirectly to exercise a controlling influence on another en-
terprise."2 Thus, other circumstances alone or in conjunction with
holdings of less than 25% of an enterprise's voting capital can be
deemed a merger. The provision requires only the possibility of a con-
trolling influence and not the actual exercise of that influence.23 A con-
tract granting another enterprise control over the appointment of
management, control over management decisions, control over
purchases or sales such as through the conclusion of very long-term
supply or sales contracts, loan contracts, or licensing agreements could
fall under this provision. 4 This catch-all provision also applies to
when "one or several" enterprises can exercise a controlling influence.2 -
Therefore, an agreement or understanding by which three enterprises,
19 BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTS iUBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IM JAHRE 1978 UBER LAGE
UND ENTWICKLUNG AUF SEINEM AUFGABENGEBIET (§ 50 GWB) 128 [hereinafter cited as TB]. In
the year 1978 there were 558 mergers reported, of which 151 were asset acquisitions, 262 were
stock acquisitions, 128 were joint-ventures, 13 were contractual links, and 4 were of other types.
In the years 1973-1978 there were 503 asset acquisitions, 1099 stock acquisitions, 630 joint-ven-
tures, 76 contractual links, 4 identity of management and 26 other types reported. Id.
20 Section 16(1) of the Stock Corporation Act, [1965] BGB I I. 1089, provides:
If the majority of shares of a separate legal person is owned by another enterprise, or if
another enterprise holds the majority of voting rights (majority holding), then the one enter-
prise is a majority owned enterprise, and the other is a majority interest enterprise.
21 FK § 23, 150; KB § 23, 73.
22 GWB § 23(2)(5).
23 KB § 23, 133; LNS KOMMENTAR § 23, 20, 24-25. See also AEG-Telefunken-Zanyssi,
[1973] TB 70-71.
24 FK § 23, 72-76; KB § 23, 133-142.
25 GWB § 23(2)(5).
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each with only 20% of the voting stock of another enterprise, obligate
themselves to coordinate the exercise of their voting rights would fulfill
this requirement. On the other hand, a controlling influence may exist
even in the absence of such an agreement if other circumstances, such
as common interests, equality of holdings, or family relationships, as-
sure common action as if such an agreement existed.26
2. Market and Share and Absolute Size Criteria
While the term merger is very broadly defined, those mergers that
must actually be reported to the Cartel Office are restricted by market
share and absolute size criteria under section 23(1), which provides
that:
A merger of enterprises shall be reported to the Federal Cartel Office
without undue delay if:
1. within the entire territory in which this law applies or within a sub-
stantial part thereof, a market share of at least 20 percent is reached
or increased as a result of the merger, or if a participating enter-
prise has a market share of at least 20 percent in another market; or
2. the participating enterprises had collectively at any one time during
the last business year preceding the merger at least 10,000 employ-
ees, or during such period had a turnover of at least DM 500 mil-
lion.
If one of the participating enterprises constitutes a controlled or con-
trolling enterprise within the meaning of § 17 of the Stock Corporation
Act or a combine enterprise (Konzernunternehmen) within the meaning
26 See Seitz, 62 BGHZ 193, WuW/E BGH 1307 (1974), (the German Supreme Court ruled
that common control of acquired enterprise through several other enterprises each owned by the
same family, assures common controlling influence; KB § 23 143-150, 236-242). See also Brost
u. Funke, - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH - (1979) (the German Supreme Court ruled that the
families Brost and Funke, which acquired enterprises through partnerships in which each family
shared equally the paid-in capital and voting rights, were each "controlling" enterprise within the
meaning of the second clause of sentence 2 of § 23(1) GWB, the wording of which is virtually
identical to § 23(2)(5) GWB). The Brost u. Funke court stated that the legal form of those in
control is not decisive; even individuals or groups of individuals may be deemed a controlling
enterprise if they have a common bond of economic interest that is
strong enough to justify the serious concern that the stockholder or partner could exercise an
influence that would have had anticompetitive effects. . . . Such a bond of economic interest
outside the partnership may be founded solely on the controlling interest being held by sev-
eral enterprises, leading to common market strategy planning and decisions.
Id.
This view is also based in part on the views expressed by the Economic Committee of the
Bundestag on June 12, 1973. It stated that "a common intent by several enterprises to dominate
[another enterprise] is required. This can also exist in cases in which a contractual agreement such
as a voting or syndicate agreement (Konsortialver/rag) does not exist." BERICHT DES WIRT-
SCHAFTSAUSSCHUSSES DES BUNDESTAGS VOM 12.6 ZUM GESETZESENTWURF DER SPD-FDP
FRAKTIONEN, BT-Drucks .7/765, at 7 (relevant portions can be found in KB, app. III) [hereinafter
cited as ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT].
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of § 18 of the Stock Corporation Act, then the enterprises linked in this
manner are deemed to be a single enterprise for purposes of computing
market shares, number of employees and turnover.
a. Particpating Enterprise
The determination of market shares and absolute size criteria de-
pend in large part upon the meaning of a "participating enterprise."
The Cartel Office interprets this term to include the acquiror and ac-
quiree enterprises, plus all of their controlled or controlling enterprises
immediately after the merger. Thus, only the acquiree, the acquiror,
and all of their controlled or controlling enterprises must be included in
the calculation. The former owner of the acquiree is not included. 28
b. Market Share
Under the first clause of the market share test in section 23(l)(1), a
report must be made to the Cartel Office if a market share of at least
20% is reached or increased as a result of the merger. This part of the
provision relates to markets commonly served by the merging enter-
prises, and thus is aimed at mergers between direct competitors, usually
referred to as horizontal mergers. The second clause of the market
share test requires that a report be made if the merger occurs between
enterprises with a minimum market share of 20% in another market,
and thus is aimed primarily at informing the Cartel Office of vertical
and conglomerate mergers. Further, the market share must relate to a
market covering all or a substantial part of Germany; foreign markets
are not relevant.2 9 Determination of market share is governed by sec-
tion 22 GWB under which geographic and product market criteria sim-
27 The Stock Corporation Act, [1965] BGBL. 1 1089, provides:
§ 17: Controlled and Controlling Enterprises
(1) Controlled enterprises are legally separate enterprises over which another enterprise
(controlling enterprise) can directly or indirectly exercise a controlling influence.
(2) An enterprise which holds a majority interest in another enterprise is presumed to con-
trol that enterprise.
§ 18: Combines and Combine Enterprises
(1) Ifa controlling and one or more controlled enterprises are united under common control
of the controlling enterprise, they constitute a combine; the individual enterprises are com-
bine enterprises. Enterprises between which an agreement granting control exists (§ 291) or
from which one is integrated into the other (§ 319) are to be treated as if united under com-
mon control. A controlled enterprise is presumed to constitute a combine with the controlling
enterprise.
(2) If legally separate enterprises not controlled by one another are united under common
control, they also constitute a combine; the individual enterprises are combine enterprises.
28 Previously, the German Supreme Court had considered the seller of assets and liabilities
also to be a participant in mergers. Keffenstichnahmaschinen, - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH 1570,
1571-72, (1979), operruling Zementmahlanlage, 65 BGHZ 269, WuW/E BGH 1377 (1975).
29 FK § 23, 89; KB § 23, 202-208. See text accompanying note 136 infra.
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ilar to those employed in the United States are applied.30 In the event
an enterprise is unsure of its market share, the practice has developed
to cooperate in good faith with the Cartel Office to help determine
whether the critical 20% level has been reached.
c. Absolute Size
Absolute size is the alternative criterion to market share upon
which the reporting requirement is based. A report must be made
under section 23(l)(2) if the merging parties and their participating en-
terprises had collectively at any one time during the last business year
preceding the merger: (1) at least 10,000 employees, or (2) a turnover
of at least DM 500 million. Total employees and turnover are com-
puted based on both domestic and foreign activities of the participating
enterprises, not just on activities in Germany.31
3. Informing the Cartel Office
When a merger, as defined by section 23, occurs that fulfills either
the 20% market share criteria or the absolute size criteria of 10,000 em-
ployees or turnover of DM 500 million, the merger must be reported to
the Cartel Office without undue delay.32 While the office can require
that a report be filed in German, it will not ordinarily object to a report
being filed in English. The Cartel Office then has one year in which to
determine whether to prohibit the merger.33 The report must indicate
the form of the merger and give the identity, type and place of business,
or residence for each participating enterprise 4.3  To the extent that the
report is required pursuant to either the market share or the absolute
size criteria, the estimated domestic market share, including the basis of
computation, must be disclosed as well as the number of employees
and turnover, both domestic and foreign. If the merger is in the form
30 See text accompanying notes 59-82 infra.
31 FK § 23, 1 110 and KB § 23, 11 110, 226 disagree with this interpretation, which is that of
the Cartel Office, and prefer that the figures relate only to domestic totals. See note 139 infra.
The minimum number of employees requirement is fulfilled if 10,000 employees are reached at
any time during the previous business year. FK § 23, $ 102; KB § 23, 1 227. Turnover is defined
by § 158 of the Stock Corporation Act, [1965] BGB1 1. 1089, as follows:
(1) For enterprises whose branch of business activity is the production or manufacture of
articles or distribution of goods, only the turnover from the production, manufacture or dis-
tribution of these articles or goods is to be reported as turnover.
(2) Turnover is to be reported after deduction of price discounts and rebates; other sums
may not be deducted.
32 GWB § 23(1).
33 GWB § 24(2).
34 GWB §§ 23(5)(l)-(2).
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of the acquisition of stock, the number of shares acquired and the total
number held must also be disclosed, including corresponding informa-
tion for all controlled and controlling enterprises and a brief explana-
tion of those relationships.35 The Cartel Office also has the right to
demand further information from the merging parties and their linked
enterprises.36
Under a separate provision, section 46 GWB, the Cartel Office has
authority to demand information and examine business documents of
third parties as well as the subjects of its investigation. This provision
further provides the Cartel Office with authority to conduct a search
during ordinary business hours without judicial order if delay presents
a danger of removal or destruction of documents. Otherwise, searches
are subject to judicial order by a local court.37
4. Sanctions
The Cartel Office may enforce the reporting requirement under
section 23 by imposing an administrative fine of DM 3 - 2,000 under
the Administrative Enforcement Act.38 This administrative fine may
be imposed at the discretion of the Cartel Office for failure to make a
report or supplying incomplete information in the report. Before im-
posing each such administrative fine, the Cartel Office must make a
demand upon the parties obligated and set a period within which it
must be fulfilled, after which the administrative fine can be imposed.3 9
The Cartel Office has concurrent authority to assess a single fine of up
to DM 50,000 for willful or negligent failure to submit, late submission,
or submission of false or incomplete information in connection with a
report under section 23, or a request for information under section 46
GWB. 40
35 GWB §§ 23(5)(3)-(4). According to the Cartel Office's announcement, Submissions in Re-
ports and Not~fcations Under §§ 23 and 24a GWB, 1974 WuW 46 (reprinted in Appendix II),
market shares, number of employees, and turnover need not be disclosed separately for every
affiliated enterprise but can be reported collectively. Normally a list of all affiliated enterprises
including name, legal form, place of business, type of business activity, and level of holdings will
suffice.
36 GWB § 23(6).
37 GWB § 46.
38 Verwaltungsollstreckungsgesetz §§ 6, 11. See KB § 23, 5 287-288.
39 Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz § 13. When the Cartel Office learns about a merger that
has not been reported, it often sends the merging enterprises a letter reminding them of their
obligation to do so. A model letter frequently used by the Cartel Office is reprinted in Appendix
IV.
40 GWB §§ 39(l)(2), 39(2). Fines totalling DM 30,000 were imposed respectively against the
president as an individual, and Korf Stahl AG, a corporation, for failure to make timely notifica-
tion under the absolute size criteria of§ 23. The report of the acquisition of 30% control over Korf
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C. Pre-Merger Notyfcation Under Section 24a
1 Compulsory Notlfcation
The primary difference between notification of a plan to merge
under section 24a and the reporting requirement under section 23 is
that pre-merger notification must be made by very large merging enter-
prises in advance of the merger, and that the merger is preliminarily
prohibited until the Cartel Office has received notification and has had
the opportunity to investigate it for a limited time period. Notification
is required under section 24a for mergers between enterprises if- (1)
"the turnover of at least two of the enterprises participating in the
merger amounted to DM 1 billion or more during the last completed
business year," or (2) "the merger is to be effected pursuant to state law,
by legislative enactment or by other sovereign act."'4 1 Computation of
total sales and content of the notification are governed by the reporting
provisions of section 23.42 When such notification is made, the merger
must be delayed for a minimum of one month. The Cartel Office is
required to inform the parties within one month after receipt that it has
commenced an investigation of the merger otherwise its authority to
prohibit the merger expires. If the Cartel Office announces an investi-
gation, the merger must be delayed a minimum of three more months,
within which the Cartel Office must deliver its decision.43 Under ex-
ceptional circumstances, this period can be extended.' A compulsory
or voluntary.notification, like a report, may be filed in English. Unlike
a report, however, a notification is subject to a fee which normally costs
DM 5,000-15,000. 4
5
Stahl on July 9, 1975, was intentionally delayed until Sept. 25, 1978, on the basis that publication
of the report as required under § 10(l)(5) GWB might lead to undesirable effects on the business
of the Korf group in a foreign country. The Cartel Office ruled that the opposing interest of the
GWB takes precedence over the interest of enterprises in secrecy. Otherwise participating enter-
prises would themselves become the judge of whether the report was necessary. Kor], Feb. 2,
1979, Cartel Office slip op., Case No. B7-270000-U-81/78 (unpublished). See also Thompson-
Brandt, May 9, 1978, Cartel Office slip op., Case No. B7-366100-U-46/78 (unpublished), dis-
cussed at note 138 infra.
41 GWB § 24a(l).
42 Id.
43 GWB § 24a(2).
44 GWB §§ 24a(2)(l)-(6).
45 The maximum fee is DM 50,000. GWB § 80(3)(1). When a merger that was "notified"
under § 24a is actually consummated, the obligation to "report" the merger under § 23 is applica-
ble. If the merger is consummated as notified, the report needs only to state that and make refer-




Voluntary pre-merger notification may also be made under section
24a by enterprises that do not fall within its compulsory notification
provisions. However, voluntary notification does not exempt one from
the obligation to report if section 23 is applicable. The major advan-
tages of voluntary notification are that the difficulties of divestiture can
be avoided and the shorter decisional period - essentially four months
instead of the one year period in the case of a report under section 23
- is imposed on the Cartel Office.46 The evidence to date does not
indicate that these incentives have proved very effective. At the end of
1978, 2338 mergers had been reported under section 23. Only 448 had
been notified under section 24a, of which 307 were compulsory and
only 141 were voluntary.47
3. Sanctions
When pre-merger notification is compulsory under section 24a, the
primary sanction for assuring that notification is made is contained in
the law itself. the preliminary prohibition of the merger until notifica-
tion is made and the Cartel Office has an opportunity to investigate the
merger48 All legal transactions in violation of this preliminary prohi-
bition are ineffective. 49 The Cartel Office also has the authority to im-
pose a fine of up to DM 50,000 for willful or negligent submission of
false or incomplete information in a compulsory notification under sec-
tion 24a50 or in connection with a request for further information under
section 46 GWB.51 The Cartel Office has further authority to impose a
fine of up to DM 100,000 or, if higher, up to three times the additional
receipts received as a result of the infringement, if false or incomplete
information is furnished for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining
merger permission for oneself or for another in the event of either com-
46 KB § 24a, 1 37.
47 [1978] TB 115.
48 GWB § 24a(l).
49 GWB § 24a (4); Weichschaum III, WuW/E BGH 1556, 1557-59 (1978); Meizeler Schaum,
WuW/E BGH 1547, 1547-48 (1978). Both decisions refer to the same case in which the merging
parties failed to notify a merger plan subject to § 24a but later reported the merger after consum-
mation under § 23. The Supreme Court held that under such circumstances the merger was pre-
liminarily ineffective until one year after the report was submitted to the Cartel Office, which
constitutes the period within which the Cartel Office has authority to prohibit the merger under
GWB § 24(2).
50 GWB § 39(l)(3) and § 39(2). The Cartel Office often sends a letter reminding the merging
enterprises to notify the Office. See note 39 supra.
5t GWB § 39(l)(1) and § 39(2).
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pulsory or voluntary notification under section 24a.52
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Once a merger has been reported under section 23 or a merger
plan has been notified under section 24a, it would seem the next step
would be simply to apply the substantive law to determine whether the
merger should be prohibited. The matter is not quite that simple. The
mere fact that a merger falls within one of the reporting provisions does
not indicate whether or not the merger is subject to prohibition. First,
minimum size and impact criteria under section 24(8), which are differ-
ent from those discussed above under sections 23 and 24a, restrict the
prohibition of mergers only to those significant to the economy as a
whole.53 If the merger meets the minimum size and impact criteria,
then a judgment must be made under sections 22 and 24 as to whether
it is likely that the merger will create or strengthen a market dominat-
ing position. If the answer is in the affirmative, the Carter Office is
required to prohibit the merger unless the merging parties prove that
the merger will lead to improvements in the conditions of competition
and that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages of the
market domination.54
A. Minimum Size and Impact Criteria Under Section 24(8)
Under any one of four absolute size conditions of section 24(8), a
merger is exempted from prohibition by the Cartel Office:
1. if the participating enterprises collectively had a turnover of less than
DM 500 million during the last completed business year; or
2. if an enterprise which had a turnover during the last completed busi-
ness year of not more than DM 50 million affiliates with another en-
terprise; or
3. insofar as it is likely that the restraint of competition will not have
effects within the entire territory in which this law applies or in a
substantial part thereof; or
4. insofar as a market for goods or commercial services is concerned
which had a sales volume of less than DM 10 million during the last
completed calender year.55
These provisions substantially narrow the number of mergers that can
be prohibited. From the introduction of merger control in mid-1973
until the end of 1978, a total of 2,338 mergers had been reported, of
52 GWB §§ 38(l)(7), 38(4).
53 See text accompanying notes 27-31 and 41-42 supra.
54 GWB § 24(1).
55 GWB § 24(8).
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which 1,232 were investigated under section 24; and 1,106 were ex-
empted from prohibition mergers under the minimum size and impact
criteria. The second of these criteria, a small enterprise exemption free-
ing from prohibition mergers involving enterprises with a turnover of
less than DM 50 million in the last business year, accounted for 919 of
1,106 exempted mergers. Moreover, 86% of the mergers so exempted in
1978 involved takeovers by giants with a yearly turnover exceeding
DM 1 billion.56 The Government has proposed an amendment to nar-
row this clause. 5
7
B. Market Domination Under Section 22 GWB
A merger can be prohibited under section 24 only if it is likely that
it will create or strengthen a "market dominating position" within the
meaning of section 22.58 An enterprise or even an oligopolistic group
of enterprises is considered to hold a market dominating position if it is
not subject to any substantial competition or holds a commanding mar-
ket position in relation to its competitors. Because of extreme difficul-
ties of proof, presumptions of market domination based on market
share were added to the law. It is also within the framework of this
provision that the relevant market is determined.
1. Defining Product and Geographic Markets
Before any meaningful analysis can be made of the merger's ef-
fects on market structure, the relevant market must be determined.
Under German antitrust doctrine, a relevant market is defined by prod-
uct, geography, and time period.59
The relevant product market is defined as a rule by the goods or
services which appear to the reasonable purchaser to be substitutable
and are actually used in place of those goods and services. 60 However,
56 [1978] TB 17-18, 115. Section 24(8)(3), on the other hand, has not proved to be a loophole.
Swabia, a county in the state of Bavaria, met the substantiality requirement. Erdgas Schwaben, __
BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1541-42 (1978). The Cartel Office considered a part of the state
Baden-Wtlrttemberg, including the city Stuttgart, to be substantial in the bank merger
Girokasse/Landessparkasse Stuttgart. [1974] TB 40. The Cartel Office also considers West Berlin
to be substantial. Kaisers Kaffee/Carisch, [1973] TB 67.
57 [1978] TB 17-18, 115; Gesetzesentwurfder Bundesregierung Entwurfeiner vierten Gesetzes zur
2nderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Sept. 27, 1978, BT-Drucks. 8/2136
(1978).
58 GWB § 24(1).
59 KB § 22, 7.
60 Erdas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1535 (1978). See also Angaben bei
Anzeigen und Anmeldungen nach §§ 23 und 24a GWB (Submissions in Reports and Notifications
Under §§ 23 and 24a GWB), 1974 WuW. 46 (reprinted in Appendix II).
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looking solely at the consumer's viewpoint will not be permitted to
skew a realistic perception of the market if the seller's side provides a
more accurate picture.61 These benchmarks for determination of a
product market approximate those followed by American courts based
on the famous Brown Shoe62 criteria. The major difference is that an
examination of market indicia on the seller's side may be more impor-
tant in determining the outer boundaries of a product market in the
United States than in Germany, where the focus of attention is prima-
rily on the purchaser's side. 63 Since it is relatively rare that differences
on the seller's side (i.e., production facilities, distribution and sales
methods) would exist without affecting the buyer's side (i.e., character,
useful purpose or price of the goods), this subtle difference in approach
to market definition should seldom affect the fundamental analysis.
Both German literature and case law emphasize that the question of
substitutability must not be judged theoretically but practically.6
Some examples of separate relevant product markets are Vitamin B-
12,65 clinker bricks,66 compact cars, middle-class cars, full-sized cars,67
road asphalt, industrial asphalt,6" standard-sized aluminum sheet, spe-
cial-order aluminum sheet,69 and electricity as distinguished from coal,
oil and gas. 0 Single product markets have been found for all types of
normal, bubbling and medicinal water,7 new, imported and re-treaded
61 Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1535-36 (1978).
62 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,325 (1962), the Supreme Court stated that
the "outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of
use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However,
within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes .... The boundaries of such submarkets may be deter-
mined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a
separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facili-
ties, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors."
63 Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1535 (1978).
64 KB § 22, 11 23-24; PapieGfiltertaten II, 51 BGHZ 371, 373, WuW/E BGH 990, 991 (1969);
Valium, WuW/E BGH 1445, 1447-48 (1976); Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH
1533, 1535 (1978).
65 Vitamin B-12, 67 BGHZ 104, WuW/E BGH 1435 (1976).
66 Klinker, WuW/E BGH 726, 729-30 (1966).
67 Automarkt, WuW/E BKartA 425 (1961).
68 Bitumen- Verkaufsgesellschaft, WuW/E BKartA 1517, 1518 (1974); Bituminiises Mischgut,
WuW/E BKartA 1753, 1754-55 (1978).
69 Kaiser-YAW, WuW/E BKartA 1571, 1578 (1974).
70 Erdgas Schwaben, WuW/E BKartA 1647, 1648 (1976); Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ
WuW/E BGH 1534-35 (1978); R WE-Energieversorgung Leverkusen, WuW/E BKartA 1727, 1728
(1978); BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BKartA 1719, 1720 (1978).
71 Unpublished opinion of the Cartel Office in Case No. B6 - 687910 - T - 238/74, referred to
in KB § 22, 37.
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tires, 72 and spare automobile parts sold through either the producer or
repair shops.73
The relevant geographical market is governed principally by the
orientation and mobility of customers, cost of freight, product perish-
ability, and customer habits or tastes.74 More expensive goods or serv-
ices capable of easy transport such as medicines,75 aluminum, 76 and
automobile clutches77 will inevitably have a large geographic market,
usually an entire country. Less valuable goods or services that are not
so transportable such as bricks,78 cement,79 asphalt," or electricity8
will usually be confined to a regional or local geographic market.
The relevant time period is an additional component to be investi-
gated in determining the relevant market. In merger cases which re-
quire a prognosis of future competitive developments, the present time
period is the basis for making a prognosis about the future. In most
other kinds of antitrust proceedings, the relevant time period is when
the alleged illegal act was committed, namely in the past. 2
2. Definition of Market Domination
Once the relevant market or markets have been determined, it
must be judged whether a dominant position within the relevant mar-
ket or markets will be created or strengthened as a result of the merger.
Market domination is defined in section 22 GWB.
a. Competitive Conditions Tests Under Sections 22(1)-(2)
The competitive conditions tests under section 22(l)-(2) are as fol-
lows:
(1) An enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of this law if
it, as a supplier or purchaser of a certain kind of goods or commer-
cial services:
72 Refien, WuW/E OLG 461, 463 (1962).
73 Registrierkassen, WuW/E BGH 1238, 1241 (1972); Original-iVW-rsatzteile, 59 BGHZ 294,
302, WuW/E BGH 1233, 1237 (1972); EDV-Ersatztelle, WuW/E BGH 1288, 1291 (1973).
74 KB § 22, 39-43; LNS KOMMENTAR § 22, 13.
75 Valium-Librium, WuW/E OLG 1645, 1648 (1976).
76 Kaiser-F4W, WuW/E BKartA 1571, 1578 (1974).
77 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 108, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1502-03 (1978).
78 KlInker, WuW/E BGH 726, 729 (1966).
79 Zementmahianlage, WuW/E BKartA 1667, 1667-68 (1976).
80 Bituminses Mischgut, WuW/E BKartA 1753, 1754 (1978), rev'don other grounds, WuW/E
OLG 2093 (1978).
81 Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1536 (1978).
82 KB § 22, 44-45; LNS KOMMENTAR § 22, 14; Sportartikelmesse II, 52 BGHZ 65, 68,
WuW/E BGH 1027, 1029-30 (1969).
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1. has no competitors or is not subject to any substantial competi-
tion; or
2. has a commanding market position in relation to its competitors;
in this connection, in addition to its market share, in particular
its financial strength, its access to supply and sales markets, and
its links with other enterprises as well as legal or factual barriers
to the entry of other enterprises into the market are to be taken
into consideration.
(2) Two or more enterprises shall also be deemed market dominating
insofar as, for factual reasons, substantial competition for a certain
kind of goods or commercial services does not exist between them,
either generally or in certain markets, and insofar as they jointly ful-
fill the conditions of subsection (1).83
Under the first alternative in section 22(1), the leading firm in a
market may be dominant because of a lack of "substantial competi-
tion" if market power gives it such a latitude of freedom of conduct
(Verhaltensspielraum) that it need not have substantial regard for the
behavior of its competitors, customers, or suppliers.84 In practice, an
important indication of market domination is the lack of substantial
price competition, such as the existence of parallel pricing or price
leadership.85 High market share or a wide difference between market
shares or the leading firm and its competitors are also signs of market
domination.86 High barriers to entry may be further evidence that the
leading firm has a latitude in pricing or other conduct tending to show
market domination.87
Proof of such a latitude of freedom of conduct is frequently elu-
sive, so in the 1973 amendment to the GWB the "commanding market
position" alternative relating to a comparison between competitors in
the relevant market was added to ease this burden. It avoids a general
evaluation of the competitive environment by focusing on identifiable
structural factors-market share, financial strength, access to supply
and sales markets, links with other enterprises, and barriers to entry-
whose comparison may show that a firm is dominant over its competi-
tors. Market share is recognized as the most important criteria of mar-
83 GWB § 22 (1) to (2).
84 KB § 22, 1 49-50; Erdgas Schwaben, __ BGHZ __ WuW/E BGH 1533, 1536-37 (1978);
Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 111-16, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1504-07 (1978); Valium, 68 BGHZ
23, 29, WuW/E BGH 1445, 1449 (1976); Vitamin B-12, 67 BGHZ 104, 113-15, WuW/E BGH
1435, 1439-40 (1976).
85 KB § 22, 1 48; Kfz-Kupp/ungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 112, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1505 (1978).
86 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 112, 122, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1504, 1510 (1978).




ket power. 8 The lack of "substantial competition" under the first
alternative is not a prerequisite to the "commanding market position"
alternative and vice versa. A commanding position can give rise to
market domination even if competitors are present and some competi-
tive forces are at play in the market but the leading firm simply holds a
paramount position over its competitors.8 9
b. Market Domination By OligopoD, Under Section 22 (2)
Market domination can also exist within an oligopoly under sec-
tion 22(2), a provision intended to apply to markets in which two or
more firms have substantial market shares and the rest of the market is
divided among smaller enterprises. First, substantial competition must
not exist between the jointly dominating oligopolists, who typically en-
gage in parallel market conduct, most frequently regarding prices. Sec-
ond, the oligopolists must collectively meet either of the alternatives in
section 22(1), lack of substantial competition or commanding market
position.90
The provisions of section 22(l)-(2) have not found broad applica-
tion because of their complexity, difficulties of proof, and the availabil-
ity of a presumption of market domination found in the next provision.
88 KB § 22, 82; Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 122, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1510 (1978);
Valium-Librium, WuW/E OLG 1645, 1651, 68 BGHZ 23, 29, WuW/E BGH 1445, 1449-50
(1976); Babcock-Artos, WuW/E BKartA 1653, 1655 (1976).
89 Vitamin B-12, 67 BGHZ 104, 113-15, WuW/E BGH 1435, 1439-40 (1976). KB § 22, 1 74-
77 takes a slightly different view that if a market dominating position exists under § 22(l)(1) be-
cause there is a lack of "substantial competition," then § 22(l)(2) does not apply. Only if there is
uncertainty about whether there is a lack of substantial competition does § 22(l)(2) apply to assist
in making that determination. If substantial competition exists, there can be no market dominat-
ing position because it would contradict the meaning and purpose of § 22, particularly its later
provisions which allow the Cartel Office to prohibit abuses of that position. In effect, a market
dominating position does not exist unless there is such a lack of substantial competition that the
position can be abused.
The authors disagree with this view because that is not how the German Supreme Court has
interpreted § 22. The Supreme Court stated, "Under No. 2 it is therefore of no consequence
whether an enterprise is exposed to no substantial competition; it suffices that competition exists
and the enterprise in question holds a dominant position as to its competitors." Vitamin B-12, 67
BGHZ at 115, WuW/E BGH at 1439 (1976). The Supreme Court has also stated that "the exist-
ence of competition and even of substantial competition [within the meaning of § 22(l)(1)] does
not exclude the establishment of a commanding market position insofar as they [the parties] still
possess a commanding latitude in their conduct as competitors. That is even possible where sub-
stantial competition still exists." Valium, 68 BGHZ 23, 29, WuW/E BGH 1445, 1449 (1976).
90 KB § 22, 11 93-106; LNS KOMMENTAR § 22, 1 33-35. In Valium, WuW/E OLG 2053,
2055-59 (1978), the Court of Appeals held that a lack of price competition alone sufficed to find an
oligopoly member not subject to "substantial competition" under § 22(1)(2) even though internal
shifting of market shares occurred within the oligopoly group because of "appreciable" innova-
tion, quality and advertising competition.
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c. Presumption of Market Domination Under Section 22(3)
The most important part of the market domination statute creates
the presumption of market domination based on market share for both
individual firms and oligopolies. The text of section 22(3) provides:
It is presumed that:
1. an enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of subsection
(1) if it has a market share of at least one-third for a certain kind of
goods or commercial services; this presumption does not apply if the
enterprise had a turnover of less than DM 250 million in the last com-
pleted business year;
2. the conditions of subsection (2) are fulfilled if, with respect to a cer-
tain kind of goods or commercial services:
a) three or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of 50
percent or more; or
b) five or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of two-
thirds or more;
this presumption shall not apply insofar as enterprises are concerned
which had a turnover of less than DM 100 million in the last com-
pleted business year.91
Thus, it is presumed that a single enterprise is market dominating if it
has at least one-third of a relevant market and has a minimum turnover
of DM 250 million. Oligopoly enterprises with a turnover exceeding
DM 100 million may also fall under the presumption of market domi-
nation. Three or fewer oligopolists with a combined market share of at
least 50%, and five or fewer oligopolists with a combined market share
of at least two-thirds, are deemed market dominating.
Most of the mergers that the Cartel Office has prohibited to date
are based on application of this provision. It is a powerful rule, for it
sweeps away at a stroke the need for the Cartel Office to go beyond the
mere proof of market share to establish its case for market domination.
The merging parties must then adduce evidence to cause the Cartel
Office to investigate further and possibly remove the presumption. If
no such evidence is forthcoming, the presumption of market domina-
tion is valid and attains substantive significance.92
91 GWB § 22(3)(l)-(2).
92 GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 24; o.b. (Johnson & Johnson), WuW/E
BKartA 1561, 1564-65 (1974); LNS KOMMENTAR § 22, 11 36-39. In theory, the Cartel Office
could prohibit a merger solely under § 22(4)-(5) if the merger itself is an abuse of a dominant
position under § 22(1) to (3). This would have the advantage of circumventing the minimum size
criteria under § 23(8). The Monopolies Commission has suggested this approach.
HAUFTGUTACHTEN I, supra note 26, § 961, at 539-40. For a general discussion of the applicability
of § 22 GWB to abusive conduct, see Edwards, American and German Policy Toward Conduct by
Powerful Enterprises: A Comparison, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1978); Gilnther, German Policy




3. Creation Or Strengthening of Market Domination Under
Section 24
The core of German merger control is the statement that a merger
is to be prohibited if "it is likely that a market dominating position will
be created or strengthened as a result of a merger. . . . The first
alternative does not require that a market dominating position exist at
the time of the merger, but rather that a market dominating position is
likely to arise in the future as a result of the merger. The second alter-
native requires that an already existing market dominating position is
likely to be strengthened as a result of the merger.9" The strengthening
must only be perceptible and need not be substantial. The German
Supreme Court has stated that under either alternative a simple com-
parison of competitive relationships immediately before and after the
merger will not suffice, but rather a prognosis must be made about
likely future competitive developments caused by the merger.96 The
long-term effects must be examined because of the irreversibility of the
structural changes that mergers cause.97 In making this prognosis, the
market share and other structural criteria of section 22(l)(2) and the
presumptions based on market share of section 22(3) play an eminent
role because merger control is directed against the deterioration of
market structures. The act applies most stringently to horizontal merg-
ers that eliminate a direct competitor,98 and less stringently to vertical
mergers that disrupt access to markets of customers or suppliers99 or
conglomerate mergers that eliminate potential competitors or foster the
growth of financial strength and resources to a degree that potential
competitors are discouraged from entering the market or existing com-
ECON. 133 (1979); and Markert, The Control of .4buses by Market-Dominating Enterprises under
German .4nt/rust Law, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275 (1978).
93 FK § 24, 1 29; KB § 24, 11 12, 16.
94 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 125, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1512 (1978); Erdgas Schwaben,
- BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1536 (1978).
95 Kfz-KuppIungen, 71 BGHZ 102, 117-18, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1507-08 (1978). This consti-
tutes a longer term prediction than was envisioned in the Government's Explanation, supra note 9,
at 29: "A prediction about future competitive developments is possible and necessary about
whether it can be said on the basis of concrete circumstances that the conditions for competition
created by the merger will worsen or improve at once."
96 FK § 24, 129; KB § 24, 1t12, 16.
97 Id.
98 KB § 24, 34; LNS KOMMENTAR § 24,18. See also Anzag-Holdermann, WuW/E BKartA
1747 (1978); BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BKartA 1719 (1978), merger authorization granted, WuW/E
BWM 165 (1979); Kaiser-VAW, WuW/E BKartA 1571 (1974); Veba-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BKartA
1457, merger authorization granted, WuW/E BWM 147 (1974).
99 KB § 24, 1139. See also Hoechst- UKW, [1975] TB 38-39; BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BKartA
1719 (1978), merger authorization granted, WuW/E BWM 165 (1979).
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petitors are dissuaded from effectively competing.' 0 These issues will
be dealt with in greater detail during the later discussion of the recent
German Supreme Court decisions. 01
"Trustworthy pledges" of enterprises participating in a merger to
undertake measures to assure that it will not create or strengthen a
market dominating position, or to secure improvements in the condi-
tions of competition, are considered in the Cartel Office's evaluation of
likely future competitive developments. Typically, this is in the form of
a promise by the merging enterprises to divest part or all of those oper-
ations which cause the merger's anticompetitive results or to undertake
other actions which may improve the conditions of competition leading
the Cartel Office to agree not to prohibit the merger. 10 2
4. Improvement of Competitive Conditions Under Section 24(1)
Under the second clause of section 24(1), the Cartel Office is to
prohibit the merger "unless the participating enterprises prove that the
merger will also lead to improvements m the conditions of competition
and that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages of the
market domination." The merger must be permitted under this balanc-
ing clause if there is a high probability that equivalent improvement of
conditions of competition will not take place without the merger. It is
not the duty of the Cartel Office to show the expected competitive im-
100 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, WuW/E BGH 1501 (1978); Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ
-, WuW/E BGH 1533 (1978).
101 See text accompanying notes 150-219 infra.
102 Discussions with the Cartel Office to avoid a confrontation may take place before reporting
the merger is necessary, after which the agreed upon solution is reported and approved; or discus-
sions may begin after reporting, giving rise to approval tied to conditions or restrictions in the
form of a contractual promise by the merging parties. See Ilapag Lloyd-Bavaria Germanair,
[1978] TB 78-79 (merger between flight charter operators not opposed because of agreement to
spin off a new, albeit smaller, flight charter operator); DWK-KEW4, [1978] TB 96-97 (merger
between the only reprocessors of waste from atomic power plants not opposed on condition that
all German atomic power facilities have equal access to the new monopolist's services). See also
notes 107 and 142 infra (discussion of Karstad-Neckermann and Slemen-Osram). The practice of
negotiating "trustworthy pledges" has been approved by the German Supreme Court. Weich-
schaum III, WuW/E BGH 1556 (1978). The Antitrust Division of the U. S. Department of Jus-
tice, on the other hand, will not ordinarily engage in such negotiations until after it has filed a
complaint requesting prohibition of the merger. Virtually the same result, however, can be
achieved via the Business Review procedure, whereby the Antitrust Division may state its enforce-
ment intentions regarding proposed business conduct. Antitrust Division Directive No. 2-68, 33
Fed. Reg. 2442 (1968), as amended by Antitrust Division Directive No. 14-73, 33 Fed. Reg. 34, 804
(1973). See Reisenkampff & Gerber, German Merger Control The Role of Company Assurances,
22 ANTITRUST BULL. 889 (1977); Satzky, Zusagen im Rahmen der Zusammenschlusskontrolle, 141
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSREcHT 554 (1977); Wolter, Die Zusagen-




provements; the burden of this proof rests on the merging enterprises.
When such proof is made, it must be viewed as part of an overall exam-
ination by the Cartel Office of the effects of the merger on competition,
including not only the improvements in the conditions of competition
that are caused by the merger, but also the improvements that would
probably have occurred even without the merger. 10 3 On the other
hand, this does not open up an analysis of the overall effects of the
merger on the economy since this judgment is made, if at all, by appli-
cation to the Federal Ministry of Economics for merger authorization
under section 24(3)." °
A merger which leads to a dominant position in a particular mar-
ket may improve the conditions of competition in some other way. If,
for instance, an acquisition leads to a concentration of market power in
the hands of the acquiror but leads simultaneously to deconcentration
of a different market in which the seller competes, the competitive ben-
efits and'disadvantages must be weighed. On the other hand, the
merger of two weak firms into a single larger and more "competitive"
firm which simultaneously raises the level of market concentration is
not to be confused with mergers that bring about real improvements in
the conditions of competition."' 5 The likelihood that a "failing com-
pany" merger would be appropriate for permission under this clause is
rather low since most failing company mergers do not cause improve-
ments in the conditions of competition. Such mergers are arguably jus-
tified on the basis of preserving jobs or because of other more general
economic interests which are not relevant to this balancing clause.0 6
In fact, the Cartel Office has concluded that the disappearance of a
company from the market by business failure is a better competitive
solution than to allow that company to be purchased by a competi-
tor.'0 7 As a rule, therefore, failing company mergers are to be permit-
103 Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533, 1539-40 (1978); KB § 24, It 51-57.
104 GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 29.
105 Haind/Holtzmann, WuW/E BKartA 1475, 1482 (1974).
106 GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 29.
107 Kaiser-VW, WuW/E BKartA 1571, 1581 (1974); Babcock-Artos, WuW/E BKartA 1653,
1655 (1976).
The Cartel Office has permitted two very substantial mergers because of weak or failing com-
panies. One involved Karstadt, Europe's largest department store chain, acquiring the failing
Neckermann, Germany's third largest mail-order house. Both firms ran department stores and
major travel agencies. The merger clearly strengthened Karstadt's dominant position in the four-
firm department store oligopoly in Germany (Karstadt, Kaufhof, Hertie and Horten), but the
Cartel Office concluded the merger was justified under the "balancing clause" because of the pro-
competitive effects of the merger in two other markets in which the firms were active, particularly
because new entry was unlikely as a result of high barriers to entry. First, the merger would
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ted, if at all, on the authority of the Federal Ministry of Economics on
the basis of collateral benefits.
5. Appeals
After the Cartel Office has prohibited a merger, the merging par-
ties have two routes of attack. The first route is to contest the validity
of the Cartel Office's ruling by appeal to the courts.10 8 The Court of
Appeals conducts a new trial of facts and law, not a mere reexamina-
tion of the legal basis of the Cartel Office's decision.'0 9 Further appeal
may then be taken on legal issues to Germany's highest court in civil
matters, the Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho)."10 The second route
is to apply to the Federal Minister of Economics for permission to
merge on the basis of collateral benefits which the Cartel Office may
not consider."' This second alternative is available either after the
Cartel Office has issued its decision or the direct appeal route through
the courts has been exhausted. The decision of the Economics Ministry
may also be challenged before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court." 1
2
preserve the existence of Neckermann in the mail-order business (if Neckermann failed, only two
meaningful competitors would remain, QueUe and Otto/Schwab); and second, the merger would
preserve Neckermann's travel agency business (if Neckermann failed, the commanding market
position of Karstadt's travel agency business, TUI, would be strengthened). The Cartel Office
conditioned its permission on Karstadt disposing of its interest in TUI. The Cartel Office specifi-
cally stated that the preservation ofjobs was not a factor in its decision to permit the merger, and
further that that issue could only be dealt with by the Ministry of Economics in a request for
merger authorization under § 24(3). [1976] TB 79-81.
The second case concerned the acquisition of Kaiser Aluminum Dosenwerk GmbH & Co.
(held indirectly by Owens-Illinois, Inc., U.S.A.) by Gerresheimer Glas AG, which held a domi-
nant position in the manufacture of glass bottles under the presumption of market domination
criteria in § 22(3)(2)(a). Kaiser Aluminum's market, aluminum cans, was dominated by a single
manufacturer several times the size of Kaiser. The merger tended to strengthen Gerresheimer by
adding cans to its container assortment, but it also strengthened Kaiser to compete against the
dominant producer of aluminum cans. The Cartel Office considered this benefit in the can market
to outweigh the damage to competition in the bottle market. It did not specifically discuss the
issue of cross-elasticity of demand between bottles and cans but appears to have viewed the two as
separate but not wholly exclusive markets. [1974] TB 38. This was probably a correct analysis.
Cans have not become the normal beer or soft drink container in Germany nearly to the extent
they have in the United States. See the discussion of this very issue in United States v. Continental
Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). Unlike the German Cartel Office, the American Supreme Court
has rejected the concept of countervailing market power as a merger defense. See United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963).
108 GWB § 62(1).
109 GWB §§ 62-72.
110 GWB §§ 73-75.
111 GWB § 24(3).
112 GWB § 24(4); KB § 2.4, 254-273; LNS KOMMENTAR § 24, 1 40.
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6 Merger Authorization by the Federal Minister of Economics
Under Section 24(3)
The test to be applied by the Federal Minister of Economics under
section 24(3) is far-reaching compared with that applied by the Cartel
Office:
Upon application, the Federal Minister of Economics shall authorize the
merger if, in the case involved, the restraint of competition is compen-
sated by the overall economic advantages of the merger or if the merger is
justified by an overriding public interest; in this connection, regard shall
be given to the competitive capability of the participating enterprises in
markets outside the territory in which this law applies. The authorization
may only be granted if the extent of the restraint of competition does not
endanger the principle of the market economy. The authorization may be
subjected to restrictions and conditions. These may not be directed at
placing the conduct of the participating enterprises under continuous su-
pervision. § 22 remains unaffected.13
The test, therefore, consists of alternative justifications, either of which
can be sufficient to justify a merger: (1) overall economic advantages,
or (2) overriding public interest, if either outweighs the anticompetitiveimpact found by the Cartel Office. The Minister of Economics has
stated:
The criteria "overall economic advantages" and "overriding public inter-
est" require in each case that there exist a general policy justification for
the merger. Authorization is to be granted only if these reasons are of
great importance in that particular case, are proved concretely and if gov-
ernmental assistance measures that would promote the competitive sys-
tem are not possible. Here it is also to be taken into account that mergers
basically result in long-term solutions that are not reversible. . . . Hence,
under § 24(3) grounds for authorization must be based not only in view of
their current importance, but also on high demands in regard to their
foreseeable duration. 14
The Minister is bound by the Cartel Office's findings as to whether a
market dominating position is created or strengthened but exercises his
perogative in determining the weight to be given to those findings in
making his evaluation.' The Minister usually requests an opinion
from the Monopolies Commission to aid in his decisionmaking." 6
Examples of overall economic advantages are rationalization
measures, strengthening branches of industry important to the econ-
omy as a whole, and preservation of unhealthy or failing companies.
113 GWB § 24(3).
114 VAW-Kaiser, WuW/E BWM 149 (1975).
115 Id; BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BWM 165, 166 (1979); Babcock-,4rtos, WuW/BWM 155
(1976); Thyssen-Haller, WuW/E OLG 1937 (1978).
116 GWB § 24b(5).
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Some common examples of overriding public interest are positive so-
cial benefits (Lie, the preservation of jobs), military need, promotion of
health, or political interests (ie., maintaining business in West Berlin).
These grounds are not valid if authorization would endanger the prin-
ciple of a market economy. Views differ as to whether this danger is to
be measured on the economy as a whole or in particular markets." 7
Only five decisions have been issued to date. The score is one denial
and four approvals, three of which included restrictions or condi-
tions. 18
The most significant authorizations have come in the sensitive field
of energy policy, beginning with the very first case the Minister of Eco-
nomics heard, Veba-Gelsenberg. 19 The Cartel Office had prohibited
the acquisition of 48.1% of the voting stock of Gelsenberg AG, the sec-
ond largest German oil company, by Veba, the largest German oil
company which was owned by the German government. The Cartel
Office had concluded that the merger created or strengthened a market
dominating position for Veba in a number of markets, including elec-
tricity, oil, and chemicals. Nevertheless, the Minister of Economics au-
thorized the merger based on the grounds of an overriding public
interest: assuring Germany's oil supplies. The government had just
adopted an energy program in 1973 which was designed to achieve im-
proved cooperation with the oil producing countries and which en-
couraged reorganization of German oil interests into the acquiree,
Veba, in order to create a large German counterweight to the non-Ger-
man oil giants with the financial strength and capacity to place it in the
position to effectively assure German oil supplies. Veba's acquisition
of Gelsenberg was seen as an indispensible first step in this reorganiza-
tion because it would improve the outlook for successful dealings with
the oil producing countries for assured quantities of oil as well as for a
direct share in large oil projects. The merger authorization was not
considered a threat to the principle of the market economy, for even
after the merger the grouping of Veba and Gelsenberg would be
counted only among the world's medium-sized oil companies in com-
117 See FK § 24, 1 119-121; KB § 24, 1 228-231. For a discussion of the failing company
issue, see Mtschel, Die Sanierungsfusion im Recht der Zusammenschlusskonirolle in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR ROBERT FISCHER 487 (1979).
118 The five cases are: Veba-Gelsenberg II, WuW/E BWM 147 (1974); VAW-Kaiser, WuW/E
BWM 149 (1975); Babcock-Artos, WuW/E BWM 155 (1976); Thyssen-Hfller, WuW/E BWM 159
(1977); BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BWM 165 (1979).
119 Veba-Gelsenberg 11, WuW/E BWM 147 (1974). The Cartel Office opinion is Veba-Gel-
senberg, WuW/E BKartA 1457 (1974).
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parison with the other oil multinationals, many of which also sold in
Germany.
The government's energy policy later showed indications of fail-
ure, which leads to the irony of the story. In 1978, Veba agreed to sell
its interest in Gelsenberg to Deutsche BP, a German subsidiary of the
multinational oil company British Petroleum, because the Gelsenberg
oil operations proved aL continuous source of financial losses. The Car-
tel Office prohibited this merger. It reasoned that first the merger
would strengthen the existing dominant position of Ruhrgas, a 25%
subsidiary of Gelsenberg. The link with BP would substantially im-
prove Ruhrgas' gas supply network. Second, the merger would elimi-
nate Deutsche BP from independent entry into the natural gas market.
In view of Ruhrgas's dominant position, the Cartel Office considered it
of particular importance that Deutsche BP not be eliminated as a po-
tential independent entrant capable of deconcentrating the oligopolistic
gas market, particularly in view of the fact that Deutsche BP had al-
ready made active attempts to diversify its German operations in sever-
al fields, including gas. In its latest decision, BP-Gelsenberg,120 the
Minister of Economics authorized this merger on the grounds of the
overriding public interest in assuring supplies of natural gas to Ger-
many. However, this authorization included detailed conditions which
were designed effectively to prevent the new BP-Gelsenberg combina-
tion from controlling Ruhrgas.121
A contrasting case is the limited authorization granted when Thys-
sen AG agreed to acquire 100% of the shares of HUller GmbH. The
120 BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BWM 165 (1979). The Cartel Office opinion is WuW/E BKartA
1719 (1978).
121 Id. The conditions attached to the authorization revolve around a complexity of voting
rights in Ruhrgas, the dominant German gas utility. After the merger, BP would have control of
Gelsenberg's 25% participation in Ruhrgas. These voting rights were part of a voting pool agree-
ment controlling over half of such rights in Ruhrgas, called the Bergemann Pool. Gelsenberg had
relinquished its voting rights in an irrevocable proxy agreement to the other participants in the
Pool, of which Gelsenberg was the leading participant. (The other participants held 14%, 7%, 4%
and 3% of the voting rights in Ruhrgas.) In order to avoid BP gaining influence over Ruhrgas at
the expiration of the proxy agreement, the Federal Minister of Economics imposed the following
conditions when authorizing the merger
1. Veba was required to offer its own 5% holdings in Ruhrgas to the Bergemann Pool.
This would remove all influence of Veba, an oil concern, in Ruhrgas. Two steel companies in
the Bergemann Pool agreed to purchase the holding.
2. BP was required to divest 16% of its 25% participation in Ruhrgas to avoid BP being
the largest single voting force in the event that the Bergemann Pool agreement expires.
3. BP was required not to conclude any geographic market sharing agreements with
Ruhrgas on gas service areas, as is ordinarily permitted utilities under German law. This
would aid in keeping Ruhrgas and BP genuine competitors in the event BP chose to enter the
German gas market.
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firms competed against each other in the production of machine tools,
but Huller was near bankruptcy and probably could not have carried
on operations without the financial strength a merger partner could
supply. The loss of jobs was raised as justification for the merger, and
the Minister of Economics rejected it on the grounds that the short-
term preservation of jobs should not be permitted to endanger the com-
petitiveness of German industry. Instead, he declared that flexible ad-
justment of market structure is needed, or otherwise an even worse loss
of jobs would occur later. The justification accepted for granting par-
tial authorization was to preserve the extraordinary technological po-
tential of Huller in the form of expert working teams required for the
production of the specialized machinery that Huller manufactured. If
Haller were permitted to fail, these teams would have broken up and
their combined knowledge and experience would have been lost. This
would in turn have reduced German competitiveness in foreign mar-
kets, a matter of fundamental importance to the German economy,
particularly in fields of high technology such as Huller's. These consid-
erations were judged as sufficient justification for Thyssen to acquire
45% instead of all of Huller's stock on the condition that Thyssen
would not restrain or harm Huller's technical capabilities. Hence,
Thyssen was allowed to acquire a substantial interest in Htiller but only
to the degree necessary to assure achievement of the political-economic
justifications advanced for the acquisition. This meant Thyssen was
required to dispose of 55% of the holdings it had acquired in HUller.' 22
III. APPLICATION OF GERMAN MERGER CONTROL TO
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS
A. The Scope of Territorial Application of the GWB
The subject matter jurisdiction rule t23 and the unilateral conflicts
rule 24 are contained together in section 98(2) GWB, which provides:
122 Thyssen-'I-iller, WuW/E BWM 159 (1977). The Cartel Office opinion is RheinstahlHt.'ller,
WuW/E BKartA 1657 (1976).
123 The subject matter jurisdiction of German administrative agencies may be exercised when-
ever German substantive law applies; it does not depend on physical presence or minimum con-
tacts. G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 533 (4th ed. 1977); 4 K. NEUMEYER,
INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 471 (1936); E. REHBINDER, EXTRATERRITORIALE
WIRKUNGEN DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS 329-34 (1965); Markert, The Application of Ger-
man Antitrust Law to International Restraints of Trade, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 42, 65 (1967). There is no
effective remedy, of course, if the party causing the domestic restraint neither transacts business
nor has an agent or property in Germany. Shapiro, The German Law against Restraints of Compe-
titian-Comparative and International 4spects, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 201, 241 (1962).
124 GWB § 98(2) is applied as a unilateral conflicts rule. in international administrative law,
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"This law applies to any restraint of competition which has an effect
within the territory in which this law applies even if it is caused outside
the territory in which this law applies." The words "restraint of compe-
tition" are a collective designation for all the antitrust rules found in
sections 1-37 GWB,12s including the merger control provisions of sec-
tions 22-24a GWB. The starting point in determining whether the
GWB is applicable to international mergers is whether they have an
effect within German territory, i e. a domestic market. In view of the
diversity of conceivable repercussions of foreign restraints of competi-
tion in domestic markets, the German Supreme Court has decided to
prevent a limitless extension of the GWB's substantive provisions at the
international level. In its 6[feldrahre decision,126 relating to applica-
tion of German antitrust rules to international restraints of trade under
section 98(2), the German Supreme Court stated:
Interpreting the meaning of domestic effect is to be determined in light of
the protected interest (Schutzzweck) of the law generally and the particu-
lar applicable provision in question .... Hence, only such consequences
of restraints of competition originating in foreign countries as infringe the
field of protection of the applicable provision can be considered as having
a domestic effect within the meaning of § 98(2).127
This limitation of section 98(2) is based on the view that the scope of
the application of German antitrust rules must be measured by the
overall objectives of the GWB in preserving free, competitive markets
in Germany and in particular by the purposes of the applicable rule, in
the case of merger control in limiting undue market concentration. It
was not the task of the German lawmakers to preserve foreign markets
free of competitive restraints and undue concentration.
international criminal law, and private international law. E. REHBINDER, supra note 123, at 110.
See also H. MULLER-HENNEBERG & G. SCHWARTZ, GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR § 98(2), 9
(3d ed. 1974); I. SCHWARTZ, DEUTSCHES INTERNATIONALES KARTELLRECHT 28 (2d ed. 1968).
Section 98(2) is the determinative conflicts rule in merger proceedings, which are of an adminis-
trative nature. E. REHBINDER, supra note 123, at 243-47.
125 This is the generally accepted view, which is based on the legislative history, the group title
"Scope of Application of the Law" to GWB §§ 98-105, and the function of § 98(2) as a conflicts
rule. H. MULLER-HENNEBERG & G. SCHWARTZ, supra note 124, § 98(2), 4; Federal Cartel Of-
fice, Domestic Effects ofMergers in the Context of§ 98(2) G WB, [1975] TB 45 (reprinted in Appen-
dix III) [hereinafter cited as Cartel Office Announcement]; I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 124, at 29-30.
126 61 BGHZ 202, 25 BGHSt 208, WuW/E BGH 1276 (1973). In this decision the German
Supreme Court declared the GWB to be not applicable to an international cartel between the only
German pipe manufacturer and other foreign pipe manufacturers because the cartel's quota and
pricing agreements affected only foreign markets.
127 b/feldrohre, 61 BGHZ 202, 25 BGHSt. 208, 212-13, WuW/E BGH 1276, 1279 (1973). The
protected interest principle was borrowed from I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 124, at 128. FK § 23,
114 would go a step further to require a structural change in Germany such as increased market
share, turnover, or number of employees.
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If one follows this approach of Germany's highest tribunal to con-
strue the reach of section 98(2) by the protected interest principle, then
the scope of the reporting provisions of sections 23 and 24a differs from
the prohibition rule of section 24, for their objectives are different. The
interest protected by the reporting provisions is the flow of information
to the Cartel Office about mergers which "may endanger the freedom
of competition on the basis of absolute size and/or competitive impor-
tance."'12 8 Whether the merger must be prohibited because it actually
creates or strengthens a dominant market position is irrelevant; the re-
porting provisions are merely to provide information which may trigger
that inquiry. Hence, if a merger is capable of having any direct and
perceptible impact on competition in a German market, then it must be
reported. 2 9 The interest protected by the prohibition rule, on the other
hand, is the preservation of competitive market structures. This means
that for any merger to be prohibited under section 24, structural
changes must occur that are actually likely to create or strengthen a
market dominating position in Germany.
130
B. Reporting or Notlcation of International Mergers
The first alternative of the market share criteria under section
23(l)(1) applies when the merger causes a 20% market share level
within Germany to be reached or increased. The domestic effect is evi-
dent: the merger causes increased concentration in a German market.
No further effect need be shown because the protected interest of the
law in following potentially anticompetitive concentration develop-
ments is clearly involved.'
The second alternative of the market share criteria under section
23(l)(1) applies when one of the enterprises participating in a merger
holds at least a 20% market share in a German market which is not
affected by the merger, i.e. a market not common to the merging par-
ties.' 32 In this case, the Cartel Office distinguishes domestic effect de-
128 Organische Pigmente, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH - (1979). See also Brost & Funke, -
BGHZ _ WuW/E - (1979). ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 70. See also
Bechtold, Markbeherrschung, Jreiskonrolle, Fusionskonrolle, [1974] DER BETRIEB 1945, 1950;
Bollack, Probleme der Meldepflicht von Zusammenschilssen gemss § 23 und der Aufgabeberech
des Karellamts, [1967] WRP 253, 257; Kartte, Die Anzeige Pon Unternehmenszusammenschfissen
nach der Kartellgestnovelle, 15 BB 589, 596-97 (1966); [1973] TB 70-71.
129 Organische Pigmente, - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH - (1979).
130 GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 24-25; ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 26, at 7; FK § 24, 21, 29, 35; KB § 24, $ 12, 16.
131 FK § 23, 121. Only domestic market shares are relevant; sales in foreign countries are not
included in the calculation. FK § 23, 114; KB § 23, 204; LNS KOMMENTAR § 23, 1 62.
132 Schaumstoff II, 54 BGHZ 311, 318, WuW/E BGH 1126, 1130 (1970).
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pending on whether the merger occurs in Germany. Domestic effect is
automatically present if the merger occurs in Germany, such as the ac-
quisition of a German enterprise or the founding of a joint venture in
Germany.'33 If the merger occurs outside of Germany, such as the ac-
quisition of a foreign enterprise by a German enterprise or the merger
of two foreign enterprises, further examination is necessary according
to the Cartel Office. In such a case, a domestic effect is certainly pres-
ent if a participating enterprise of either merging party is German and
the structural elements for competition in Germany are affected, or if
participating enterprises of both merging parties were active in the Ger-
man market before the merger. Further, a domestic effect may be pres-
ent if a participating enterprise of one of the merging parties was active
in the German market before the merger and it is likely that a foreign
participant will supply the German market or the know-how or indus-
trial property rights of a domestic enterprise will be perceptibly in-
creased. 134
The same considerations apply in judging domestic effects under
the absolute size criteria of sections 23(l)(2) and 24a. 35 An example is
the recently decided Organische Pigmente136 case in which Bayer AG
with 4% of the German organic pigment market acquired the American
organic pigment facilities of Allied Chemical Corporation, whose share
133 Cartel Office .4nnouncement, supra note 125; FK § 23, T 114.
134 Cartel Office4nnouncement, supra note 125. Others have contended that in such a case both
enterprises must also have been commercially active in Germany prior to the merger. Klaue,
Ausiindische Unternehmenszusammenschlisse und § 23 GWB, 1965 WuW 15, 17; or even that
domestic interests are not involved at all because the merger has not caused a change in domestic
market share. FK § 23, 91114. Another view is that a 20% market share held by any participating
enterprise without more is enough to require a report. Kartte, supra note 128, at 596-97.
135 Cartel Office Announcement, note 125 supra. See the discussion of Korf, note 40 supra. In
Foto Quelle, [1974] TB 34, the Cartel Office ruled that the acquisition by a German enterprise of
two foreign subsidiaries of another German enterprise had no effect in Germany and therefore
need not be reported under § 23. The acquired enterprises were engaged in sales and developing
of film in France and Holland through four sales operations and contracts with 30-40 drug stores.
136 Organische Pigmente, - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH - (1979). The Supreme Court also
approved of other findings by the Court of Appeals which Bayer chose not to challenge before the
Court: Bayer had contended it did not actually control the acquiree (1) because it was held
through a chain of Bayer's subsidiaries (the acquisition was made by Harmon Colors Corporation,
Trenton, a 100% subsidiary of Rhinechem Corporation, New York, a 100% subsidiary of Bayer
International Finance N.W., Dutch Antilles, which in turn was a 100% subsidiary of Bayer AG,
Germany), (2) because of the New Jersey corporations act, which provides that the board of direc-
tors of a corporation is the controlling body, and (3) because Bayer AG would be unlikely to want
to exercise effective control in order to avoid undesirable tax repercussions (Bayer could be
deemed a "permanent establishment" in the United States and thus become subject directly to
American taxes). The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court agreed that only the possibility of
control need to be shown. Whether control is actually exercised or not is irrelevant. See Or-
ganische Pigmente, WuW/E OLG 1993, 1994-95 (1978).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:371(1979)
of that same market was a miniscule 0.2%. The Supreme Court never-
theless found that the merger must be reported because it had "percep-
tible direct effects" in Germany: Allied Chemical would be eliminated
as a competitor and Bayer would gain access to valuable know-how
that would assure it a better market position against its competitors.
Another issue under the absolute-size criteria is whether the turno-
ver and employees to be included in the calculation are those within
Germany or worldwide. Some writers contend that the absolute-size
criteria must be fulfilled within Germany, and thus foreign turnover
and employees are to be excluded from the calculation.'37 The practice
of the Cartel Office, on the other hand, is to make no differentiation
between foreign and domestic activities in making the calculation. 1
38
Although this view has not yet been tested in the courts, it reflects the
better view because it is in harmony with both the wording of the law
and its informational purpose. 139
C. Prohibition of International Mergers
The extent of the Cartel Office's authority under section 24(1) to
take action against international mergers depends first on whether the
merger has a domestic effect under section 98(2) GWB. According to
137 KB § 23, 1 114-115. Others contend there is a sufficient domestic effect only if the absolute
size characteristics change in Germany as a result of the merger. FK § 23, $114; E. REHBINDER,
supra note 123, at 231. Another view is that a report must be made if the absolute size characteris-
tics are fulfilled and at least one participant in the merger was active in the German market before
the merger. Kartte, supra note 128, at 596-97.
138 In Thompson Brandt, May 9, 1978, Cartel Office slip op., Case No. B7-366100-U-46/78
(unpublished), the Cartel Office threatened to impose the maximum fine under the Administrative
Enforcement Act of DM 2,000 against both merging parties for failure to report a foreigner's take-
over of a German enterprise under the absolute size criteria. Thompson-Brandt, the French ac-
quiree, fulfilled the absolute size criteria but contended that criteria applied only to German enter-
prises. The Cartel Office ruled against that argument, stating that "giant enterprises are subject to
merger control even if they have their domicile in a foreign country and do not yet have any
turnover in Germany but merge with a German enterprise or make an acquisition of a German
enterprise under § 23(2) GWB." Slip op. at 3-4.
139 KB § 23, 1 218; o.b. (Johnson & Johnson), WuW/E BKartA 1561, 1563 (1974); GOVERN-
MENT's EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 26. From the wording, legislative history, and sense of the
law there is no basis on which to apply the absolute size criteria of § 23 or § 24a only to domestic
business activities. The text of the law speaks of turnover and employees alone; no express limita-
tion to the German market is referred to, as is the case under the market share criterion of§ 23(1)
(1), which immediately precedes it. In Government's Explanation, note 9 supra, it was emphasized
that turnover and employees of linked enterprises domiciled outside of Germany are to be in-
cluded in the calculation just as that of linked enterprises located in Germany. A further indica-
tion is the statement in § 23(l), sentence 3, that turnover in foreign currencies shall be converted
into German marks at the official exchange rate. Restriction of the absolute size criteria to the
domestic sphere would also create practical difficulties and diminish the value of§ 23 and § 24a as
clear, straightforward reporting rules.
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the already discussed protected interest principleI 4 interpretation of
domestic effect under section 98(2) is governed by the objectives of the
law as a whole to preserve competitive markets, and in particular by
the policy of the substantive provision, section 24 GWB, whose pri-
mary task is to prohibit mergers between enterprises that are likely to
create orstrengthen a market dominating position in a German mar-
ket. So long as the merger is likely to have either of these effects, the
protected interest has been infringed and the Cartel Office may take
measures to stop the infringement. The issue then is to limit enforce-
ment to German soil and select appropriate methods of eliminating the
merger's undesirable effects. 41
If a foreign enterprise acquires a German enterprise whereby a
market dominating position is created or strengthened in Germany,
then section 24 is applicable because the merger has the proscribed do-
mestic effect. The Cartel Office can meaningfully apply the provisions
of section 24 because one of the participants in the merger, here the
acquiree, is directly subject to German law. If the Cartel Office chooses
to prohibit the merger, under section 24(7) GWB it may declare the
legal obligations under the merger agreement to be ineffective, impose
a non-recurring or recurring penalty of DM 10,000 to DM 1 million,
and even appoint a trustee to carry out dissolution of the merger. If a
foreign acquiror has achieved control of the German enterprise by the
acquisition of stock, then the Cartel Office may prohibit the parent
from exercising voting rights in or receiving profits from the acquired
enterprise. 142 These measures can also be applied to the acquisition of
140 See notes 127 and 136 and accompanying text supra (Oldfeldrjhre and Organische-Pig-
mente).
141 FK § 24, 69, 181; KB § 24, 1 322-326.
142 GWB § 24(7). The same considerations would apply if a foreign enterprise acquires an-
other foreign enterprise which has a German subsidiary, i.e. a participating enterprise under
GWB § 23(3). Wurdinger, Arten und Formen der Unternehmenszusammenschlasse iS. der neuen
§§ 23 bis 24 GWB, 1973 WuW 731, 741-42.
The Cartel Office prohibited the founding of a joint venture between an American filmmaker
and one of the largest German film theater chains. (Their identities were not disclosed.) The joint
venture was prohibited because it would strengthen the market dominating position of the Ger-
man theater chain in first-showings and drive-in theaters and threaten the competitive structure of
small and medium-sized theater businesses. Because the joint venture partners voluntarily agreed
to dissolve the joint venture, a formal prohibition order was not issued. [1977] TB 76.
In Siemens-Osram, [1975] TB 37-38, two mergers were investigated. When the General Elec-
tric Company notified its plan to acquire AEG-Telefunken's 57% interest in the largest German
light bulb manufacturer, Osram GmbH, the parties agreed to take measures in order to avoid
prohibition by the Cartel Office. The merger would have strengthened Osram's market dominat-
ing position by elimination of GE as an actual competitor (GE sold small quantities of light bulbs
in Germany) and as a potential competitor (GE had shown interest in purchasing existing Euro-
pean light bulb manufacturers). The Cartel Office and the merging parties held discussions about
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a foreign enterprise by a German enterprise.' 43
In the case of mergers between foreign enterprises consummated
outside of Germany, simple application of the protected interest princi-
ple could lead to unreasonably broad application of German merger
control outside German territory. One thinks of the borderline case in
structural measures to promote competition, and agreed upon the following: Osram agreed to
withdraw from existing joint ventures and other relationships with the second largest seller of light
bulbs in Germany, Philips; agreed to offer smaller German light bulb manufacturers technical
assistance; and agreed to divest its radium light operations, which held a market dominating posi-
tion. When the merger agreement faltered, Siemens agreed to acquire Osram instead of GE.
Siemens is probably the largest enterprise in Germany and is a leading manufacturer of electrical
goods of virtually all kinds. The Cartel Office agreed to permit this merger based on the following
conditions: Osram agreed to transfer control of a joint venture with Philips to a trustee; agreed to
divest its share in three other joint operations with Philips; and agreed to withdraw from the
general rebate cartel for electric lights, of which Philips was also a participant. Further, AEG-
Telefunken, a major German electrical appliance manufacturer from which Siemens was to ac-
quire the interest in Osram, agreed to no longer purchase light bulbs exclusively from Osram.
Osram was permitted, however, to strengthen an existing contract on exchange of know-how and
other technical information with Philips. [1975] TB 37-38.
143 The merger itself can be prohibited if the acquiror is in Germany. If only a participating
enterprise of the acquiror under § 23(3) is in Germany, then only that enterprise, and not the
acquiror, could be reached by the prohibition order. See note 145 infra.
In AEG-Telefunken-Zanussi, [1973] TB 70-71, the Cartel Office determined § 24 applied to
acquisition of a 25% participation by the German enterprise AEG-Telefunken in the Italian enter-
prise Zanussi. Both were leading manufacturers of electrical appliances in the EEC, and AEG
had contracted substantial purchases of such appliances from Zanussi for three years before the
merger. Together the enterprises met the market domination presumptions for certain classes of
appliances. After the Cartel Office informed AEG that prohibition of the merger was likely, AEG
reduced its participation to only 20%, thus falling below the 25% stock participation requirement
defined as a merger under § 23(2)(2). The Cartel Office then examined whether the 20% participa-
tion combined with the sales agreement sufficed as "any other relationship" giving AEG "control"
over Zanussi under § 23(2)(5), and concluded at that level AEG did not control Zanussi but that
control could be achieved if the contractual relationship were substantially strengthened. At the
time, AEG's purchases constituted 10% of Zanussi's entire production and the firms had a cooper-
ation agreement in the field of household appliances.
In SNMP-Hoechst, [1976] TB 66-67, the Cartel Office decided there was no violation of
GWB § 24(1) but that domestic effect was present in the acquisition of Socidt6 Normande de
Mati~res Plastiques S.A. (SNMP) by Company Financir6 Chimico S.A. (CPC), a subsidiary of
the German chemical giant Hoechst. SNMP had not sold polypropylene in Germany, but it had
cooperated with two other French chemical manufacturers to produce polypropylene. Hoechst
was the largest manufacturer of polypropylene in Germany with over one-third of the market.
The Cartel Office decided not to intervene because the owners from which Hoechst's subsidiary
acquired SNMP determined to construct their own polypropylene facility in Germany. Further,
Hoechst already had more polypropylene capacity in Germany than that needed to supply over
100% of the German market, and yet had sold virtually no polypropylene in France to that point.
In Schering-Phillos, [1977] TB 64, the Cartel Office decided against prohibiting the acquisi-
tion of the assets of Philips-Duphar B.V. and N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken of Holland by
Schering Ag, a German enterprise, as notified under GWB § 24a. The Cartel Office determined
that the merger was unlikely to result in a market dominating position and the markets affected




which two giant enterprises located outside Germany merge effecting a
market dominating position in Germany based solely on their exports
to Germany. Neither of the merging parties may have a permanent
establishment or significant assets in Germany other than, for instance,
a registered agent, a few employees, some industrial property rights,
and merchandise stored in a rented warehouse. Under the protected
interest principle, there can be no doubt that a domestic effect determi-
native for the application of section 24 would be present in such a case
because the merger creates a dominant position in Germany. Although
the Cartel Office has authority to take action against the merger, that
action must be tempered according to the principles of international
law, which are binding as part of German law under article 25 of the
German Constitution.'" Under those principles, the execution of sov-
ereign acts of states is to be limited to the territory of that state. The
enforceability of prohibition orders of the Cartel Office must therefore
be restricted to German territory. 45 The Cartel Office's action can be
directed only against such parts of the merging enterprises as are within
reach of sovereign German authority, i.e. against their subsidiaries, af-
filiates, industrial property rights, or other property located in Ger-
many. In view of the overriding interests of foreign states to prosecute
their own national economic policies on their own soil, which might
even be designed to promote concentration, the Cartel Office must de-
termine on a case-by-case basis whether orders directed at the German
parts of the merging enterprises can serve to substantially mitigate or
eliminate the undesirable effects of the merger in Germany without un-
reasonably encroaching on the legitimate regulatory interest of foreign
states.' 46 To this end, section 24(6) provides for removal of the re-
144 GRUNDGESETZ art. 25 (V. Ger.).
145 ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 6; FK § 24, 1181; Markert, supra note
123, at 51, 65; Paul, Unternehmenskonzentradion und Antitrust Gesetzgebung in der BRD, [19751
DER BETRIEB 1253.
146 During 1978 the Cartel Office did not find it necessary to intervene against several acquisi-
tions of American chemical facilities by German enterprises even though § 24 GWB was applica-
ble. The Cartel Office noted that the primary competitive effects of these acquisitions would be
felt in the American market. The acquisitions included: (1) raising the holdings of Friedrich
Flick Industrieverwaltung KGaA in W.R. Grace & Co., New York, to above 25%; (2) the acquisi-
tion of over 30% of the capital of U. S. Filter Corp., New York, by the same enterprise; (3) the
acquisition of the Pigment Division of Chemetron Corporation, Chicago, by Bayer AG (which
Bayer abandoned when the acquisition was opposed by the Federal Trade Commission, Bayer
agreeing to a consent order which became final June 6, 1979, [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,584. Whereupon another German firm, BASF Wyandotte Corp. (2% of American organic
pigment market) acquired Chemetron's Pigment Division (9% of American market), which led to
another FTC complaint challenging that merger. [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,553.); (4)
the take-over of Miles Laboratories by Bayer (which has resulted in a FTC consent order under
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straint of competition "in a manner other than through the re-establish-
ment of the originally prevailing conditions."' 14 7 This gives the Cartel
Office reasonable discretion to formulate alternative solutions to pre-
serve competitive markets without necessarily prohibiting the merger
itself. 148
Such a circumstance as described here will rarely occur. If the
merger of two foreign enterprises consummated outside of Germany
has the impermissible domestic effect, namely the creation or strength-
ening of a market dominating position in Germany, it is expected that
the foreign enterprises will have a substantial presence in Germany
through subsidiaries or affiliates.
When this is the case, section 23(3) GWB expressly provides that a
merger between enterprises is also deemed to be a merger of the enter-
prises they control. Thus, even though the domestic subsidiaries, for
instance, are not actually the merging parties, the Cartel Office is to
consider them as merging parties and may prohibit them from falling
under common control of the surviving foreign parent while leaving
the foreign parents themselves free to merge. If, for example, two
American computer manufacturers, each with a German subsidiary,
reach a merger agreement to combine their worldwide operations that
is likely to create or strengthen a market dominating position in Ger-
many by uniting their German subsidiaries under common control, the
Cartel Office could not prohibit the merger of the American parents but
could require that one or both of the German subsidiaries be divested
or take other action against their German property as previously dis-
cussed under section 24(6)-(7) GWB.149
which Bayer agrees to divest all of Miles Laboratories' assets used primarily to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or sell allergic extracts in the United States since Bayer ranked first (35-40% market share)
and Miles third (12% market share) in such sales. [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9 21,602); (5)
raising the participation of BASF in Dow Badische Co., Williamsburg, from 50% to 100% as well
as the take-over of GAF-Corp. organic colors and pigment facilities in Rensselaer, New York; (6)
the acquisition of over 97% of the stock capital of Alcon Laboratories, Inc., Forth Worth, by the
Nestle-Gruppe Deutschland GmbH; (7) the consolidation of Nease Chemical Corp., State Col-
lege, with an American subsidiary of Rttgerswerke AG; and (8) the acquisition of the Chemical
Products Division of Ashland Oil, Inc., Ashland, by Schering AG ([1978] TB 61-62). An agree-
ment between the United States and Germany permits the exchange of information between the
respective antitrust authorities on restrictive business practices. [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
50,283. During 1978, information was exchanged concerning seven cases. [19781 TB 44.
147 GWB § 24(6).
148 FK § 24, It 69-70; KB § 24, 9 322, 324-26.
149 FK § 24, % 71; KB § 24, T 323; GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION, supra note 9, at 27; Ebel,




IV. MERGER DECISIONS OF THE GERMAN SUPREME COURT
During 1978 the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho/) is-
sued its first two merger decisions. The first of these, the Sachs case,1
50
has stirred considerable antitrust debate in Germany because prohibi-
tion of the merger was based on the theory that Sachs' dominant posi-
tion in the motor vehicle clutch market would be strengthened solely by
means of the acquiror's fivefold financial resources. The second case,
Erdgas Schwaben,151 which concerned the establishment of a joint ven-
ture gas utility by three existing utilities, is destined to stir debate about
its discussion of balancing the improvement of competitive conditions
against the disadvantages of the market domination caused by the joint
venture. Both cases are of interest not only because they are the first
decisions of the German Supreme Court, but also because they provide
insights into key aspects of German merger control.
A. The GKN-Sachs Merger
When the British firm Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. (GKN), a
major manufacturer of automobile drive train and other steel-related
products, made notification under section 24a of its plan to acquire 75%
of the holdings in Sachs AG, the German Cartel Office prohibited the
merger because it would strengthen Sachs' dominant position as manu-
facturer of clutches for motor vehicles. 52 The Court of Appeals (Kam-
mergericht) later reversed this decision. 5 3 The Supreme Court,
however, also reversed. 154 While employing different reasoning from
that of the Cartel Office, the Court ultimately prohibited the merger. 55
Although both GKN and Sachs were engaged in related lines of
business in Germany, none of their products were in direct competi-
tion. The most important product of Sachs was motor vehicle clutches,
which accounted for 36% of its turnover. GKN also produced clutches
in England through a 100% subsidiary, Laycock Engineering Ltd., but
150 Kfz-Kupplungen, 71 BGHZ 102, WuW/E BGH 1501 (1978). Other discussions of the case
are: BlhIke and Schoppe, Der GKN-Sachs-Fall Eine Bewihrung der Fusionskontrolle? [1978]
DER BETRIEB 1113; Markert, Comment, [1978] Betriebs-Berater 678; Moosecker, Fusionskontrolle
und Rechts-sicherheit, [1978] GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHJTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 517;
Steindorff, Zur Verstidrkung einermarkbeherrschenden Stellungnach GKN/Sachs Entscheidung des
BGH Yom 21. Februar 1978 - KV)R 4/77. Ein Beitrag zu komplemenfiren Zusammen-schlissen,
[1978] ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 778.
151 Erdgas Schwaben, - BGHZ - WuW/E BGH 1533 (1978).
152 GKN-Sachs, WuW/E BKartA 1625 (1976).
153 Sachs, WuW/E OLG 1745 (1976).
154 71 BGHZ 102, WuW/E BGH 1501 (1978).
155 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:371(1979)
did not sell them in Germany. However, GKN produced and sold
automobilie drive-train components through a major German subsidi-
ary, Unicardan, which it had acquired in 1971. The Cartel Office de-
termined the relevant product markets to be clutch discs and clutch
pressure plates sold to German automobile producers, excluding the
replacement market and in-house production by automobile manufac-
turers. On this basis, the market share of Sachs during the years 1970-
1975 ranged between 73.5% and 82.9% for clutch discs and 68.4% and
72.9% for clutch pressure plates. Although these market shares would
not be directly affected by the GKN acquisition, the Cartel Office pro-
hibited the merger on the basis that GKN's financial strength, some
five times that of Sachs, would cause a perceptible strengthening of
Sachs' existing market dominating position in the German clutch mar-
ket under section 24(1) GWB. 5 6
The Cartel Office found that GKN had much broader access to
capital markets than Sachs because of its size and diversity, that GKN's
existing fivefold financial strength would probably add more weight to
Sachs' bargaining power with its customers, the automobile manufac-
turers, and that this financial strength would also be available to Sachs
to defend against new entry by potential entrants into the German
clutch market.157 The Cartel Office further ruled that it need not be
proved that the merging companies actually intend to employ these ad-
ded financial resources to force existing competitors out of the market
or discourage potential competitors from entering the market.158 It was
decisive alone, according to the Cartel Office's reasoning, "that the
market dominating enterprise would be in the position to call upon the
increased financial resources for defending against assaults on its mar-
ket position."' 59 The Cartel Office also noted that it was within the
goals of merger control to prevent the growth by merger of a very
strong international conglomerate such as GKN which held a strong
market position in related fields of automotive components, particu-
larly drive-train components. 160
The Court of Appeals of Berlin (Kammergericht) reversed the Car-
tel Office's decision.' 61 Although the Court of Appeals fundamentally
agreed with the Cartel Office's view of Sachs as a market dominating
156 WuW/E BKartA at 1628.
157 GKN-Sachs, WuW/E BKartA 1625, 1629 (1976).
158 Id.
159 WuW/E BKartA at 1629.
160 Id. at 1630.
161 See note 153 supra.
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enterprise, it disagreed that GKN's financial strength would percepti-
bly strengthen Sachs' dominant market position. 6 z The Court of Ap-
peals required a prognosis about future competitive developments
which "can not be abstractly based upon pure theoretical possibili-
ties,"' 63 but rather is to be founded "upon specific circumstances with
a high level of probability that the expected advantages will material-
ize."''" Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded it was un-
likely that Sachs would need GKN's financial resources because Sachs
already had more than sufficient resources at its disposal for any invest-
ments, research or price competition foreseeably needed.
A few years before the merger Sachs had borrowed DM 40 million
without difficulty, confirming that it had adequate access to credit mar-
kets without GKN standing behind it. There appeared to be no rea-
sons to expect the need for additional resources at all for price
competition; for many years competition had focused principally on
product quality and supply dependability while prices had remained
practically identical. Further, there had not been a newcomer to upset
the market with construction of a clutch manufacturing facility in Ger-
many for over a decade despite rapid expansion of the German auto-
mobile industry in this period, and there did not appear to be any
competitive threats waiting in the wings to enter the German clutch
market. Existing German and potential foreign competitors were al-
ready so strong financially that any discouraging effects from GKN's
financial resources would be minor. Besides, GKN was no financial
giant, and it would be difficult in any event for GKN to transfer
financial resources to Germany from England because of British ex-
change control regulations. 165
Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded there seemed to be no con-
crete indication that Sachs would be strengthened in any material com-
petitive aspect other than some general mistrust of size, which it
declared would not be a proper basis for prohibiting the merger. Fi-
nally, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the merger of
two large, diversified enterprises would lead to a general strengthening
of their entire operations, permitting the development and introduction
of particular strategies that otherwise would not be available. The
Court said that such general economic consequences do not fall under
sections 22 and 24 GWB unless effects can be shown in specific mar-
162 WuW/E OLG at 1753.
163 Id. at 1754.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1755-56.
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kets, and it could find none in this case. Thus, Sachs was already in
such a safe market-dominating position with no prospects of even be-
ing challenged that the addition of GKN's financial strength was not
material to its perpetuation. 16
6
The German Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion, determining that GKN's financial resources would in fact
strengthen Sachs' market-dominating position. 167 The Supreme Court,
however, did not accept the Cartel Office's proposition that GKN's
financial strength could simply be presumed to expand Sachs's latitude
of freedom of conduct (Verhaftensspielraum) and discourage both ac-
tual and potential competition. Instead, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the decisive point was not whether GKN would actually place its
financial resources at Sachs' disposal; rather, it was how existing and
potential competitors would perceive that GKN's financial strength
might be used against them at some future time if they attempted price
competition with Sachs.
The Supreme Court fully accepted the proposition that Sachs held
a market-dominating position. Based on the Supreme Court's market
definition, the value of shipments of clutch discs and pressure plates to
motor vehicle manufacturers, therefore excluding the in-house manu-
facturer Opel, Sachs had a market share of 78% for clutch pressure
plates and 80% for clutch discs, well in excess of that needed for pre-
sumption of market domination under section 22(3) GWB. 168
The Supreme Court found this presumption of market domination
confirmed by Sachs' special access to customers, its longstanding sup-
ply relationships, and the inability of its sole actual domestic competi-
tor, Lamellen und Kupplungsbau GmbH (LuK)-which was already
producing at full capacity-to capture business from Sachs. Although
LuK enjoyed a trust from motor vehicle manufacturers equal to that of
Sachs, this did not negate finding Sachs a market-dominating enter-
prise. Sachs' persisting status as first supplier of clutches to the Ger-
man automobile manufacturers, which limited themselves to only one
or two suppliers, demonstrated that LuK had not been able to fully
succeed in challenging Sachs. The Court also rejected the argument
that the ability of LuK to enter the clutch market years ago con-
tradicted finding that Sachs was market-dominating at the present.
The evidence suggested, rather, that barriers to entry were high, and as
between Sachs and LuK, Sachs was a virtually unchallengeable market
166 Id. at 1755, 1756-57.
167 71 BGHZ 102, WuW/E BGH 1501.
168 Id. at 110, WuW/E BGH at 1503.
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leader in Germany. Within the rest of Europe, there were only six
other clutch manufacturers, and only one of these, Borg & Beck, a Brit-
ish clutch manufacturer, had made a significant attempt to capture a
share of the German market. Borg & Beck had entered in 1974 and by
1975 had captured only 3-4% of the German market.'69
The focal point of the case was whether the financial power of
GKN, with some fivefold the turnover and profits of Sachs, would be
likely to strengthen the market-dominating position of Sachs. The
Supreme Court examined three issues related to whether GKN's
financial resources would strengthen Sachs' market-dominating posi-
tion: whether in the foreseeable future Sachs would need special re-
sources for investment, research and, above all, for price competition;
whether in such an event Sachs' existing resources would not already
be sufficient; and whether competition from current importers or others
that might possibly want to enter the market as newcomers would be
discouraged as a result of the merger. The Supreme Court determined
to prohibit the merger based on only the last of these, the discourage-
ment of actual and potential competition. 7 °
The Cartel Office had contended that a worsening of competitive
conditions existed in this case in the perceptible raising of the potential
of Sachs to discourage competition by a perceptible strengthening of its
available financial resources. It should not be necessary to take the
next step, namely to show further by concrete circumstances that there
is a high likelihood that competition will actually be restrained as a
result of the worsened competitive conditions. 171
The Supreme Court refused to follow this reasoning. In its view,
financial strength merely represented a precondition to widening the
latitude of a market-dominating enterprise's freedom of conduct within
a particular market. Before a merger is to be prohibited based solely
on financial strength, the Supreme Court stated, "It must be discernible
in which direction individual competitive schemes or strategies could
be employed individually or collectively without being subjected to
competition, or what competitive effects are likely from any of these
kinds of conduct by market-dominating enterprises."' 172 Further, it is
sometimes necessary to look beyond the present to future effects:
Accordingly, in the usual case the position in the market existing before
the merger is to be examined in view of the existing competitive circum-
169 Id. at 105, 108-13, WuW/E BGH at 1502-05.
170 Id. at 113-14, WuW/E BGH at 1505-06.
171 Id. at 114-15, WuW/E BGH at 1506.
172 Id. at 117, WuW/E BGH at 1507.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:371(1979)
stances and compared with the competitive circumstances brought about
by the merger. However, the Cartel Office. . . is not limited to an assess-
ment of the conditions of competition as they existed at the moment of
the merger. Rather, a prediction about future competitive developments is
then possible and also necessary if it can be concluded on the basis of
concrete circumstances with high likelihood that the competitive circum-
stances created by the merger will change at once. If the comparison be-
tween competitive circumstances before and after the merger does not
reveal a change in market-dominating position, then accordingly the fu-
ture competitive developments should also be permitted to be included in
the prognosis under the described strict preconditions. . . .
The Court further stated:
[I]n the present case the comparison was limited to the competitive situa-
tion as it existed before and after the intended merger. The competitive
circumstances created by the merger, in particular those affected among
the structural criteria stated in § 22(l)(2) GWB, including those related to
the enterprise's financial strength and affiliations, are to be examined for
the influence they have on the latitude of freedom of conduct
(Verhaltensspielraum) to employ particular methods of competition or de-
velop varying market strategies. Under this approach the examination
may not be limited to the effects that are likely to occur immediately in a
particular case; rather, their long-term effects are to be considered because
of the irreversibility of the structural changes brought about by the
merger. 1
74
Applying this rule to the GKN-Sachs merger, the Supreme Court
found the decisive effects those impacting on existing and potential
competitors.
While the Court of Appeals had determined that it was unlikely
Sachs would need special financial means in the foreseeable future for
investment, research, or price competition, and thus the addition of
GKN's financial strength to Sachs would not change competitive cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court chose to look at the merger from a
different perspective, that of the existing and potential competitors.
The Court stated:
What is decisive for the considerations that are controlling is only
whether Sachs after the merger because of a different type of business
policy and marketing strategy objectives within the framework of a con-
glomerate giant will be perceived as motivated and determined to defend
against price competition with the help of increased financial strength ear-
lier and more vigorously than would be the case if its independence were
preserved. Under this approach, it is to be taken into consideration that a
giant conglomerate enterprise as such, to the extent it is not merely hold-
ing a financial interest, does not follow the same market strategies as a
173 id. at 117-18, WuW/E BGH at 1507-08 (emphasis is original).
174 Id. at 118-19, WuW/E BGH at 1507-08.
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single-product enterprise or, as here, a substantially smaller enterprise
with a different conglomerate character.
. . . [TIhe acquiring enterprise's substantial sales in related automo-
tive components markets including the German market also induces com-
petitors to consider an intense defense against their envisaged price
competition to appear likely because failure to make such a defense could
affect the consolidation of its position in the related markets it supplies.1
75
The Supreme Court believed that the major anticompetitive effects
of the merger were to discourage price competition from existing and
potential competitors because they would perceive Sachs as an even
more imposing foe after the merger with GKN. The primary reason
given by the Supreme Court for competitors to perceive Sachs as more
imposing after the merger was that GKN and Sachs were commonly
engaged in the supply of automotive components to the motor vehicle
producers, thus giving GKN particular incentive to use its financial re-
sources to defend against assaults on Sachs' market position in order to
prevent repercussions in related markets that GKN served. Preserving
the market structure existing before the merger offered a better chance
for the reappearance of price competition in the German clutch mar-
ket.
In the Supreme Court's view, the market in which price competi-
tion appears weakest and competition has shifted to product quality
and supply reliability is the very market in which, according to the
objectives of merger control, one must hold open the chances for return
of price competition over the long run, perhaps by entry of potential
competitors from foreign countries.' 76 The Court pointed to the en-
couraging new entry of Borg & Beck, the British importer. Since the
merger would create the perception that Sachs was even better pre-
pared and determined to fight off competition than before, this would
"decisively decrease the chances for renewal of price competition. This
effect amounts to further securing and thereby strengthening of the
market-dominating position of Sachs by the merger which justifies its
prohibition."' 77
175 Id. at 120, 123, WuW/E BGH at 1509, 1511.
176 Id. at 120-21, WuW/E BGH at 1509.
177 Id. at 124, WuW/E BGH at 1511. GKN's 25% stock interest in Sachs was later sold to
Deutsche Commerzbank AG. The Sachs family then sold off another 23% interest to Salzgitter
AG, a government-owned steel manufacturer. This sale was not deemed a merger under § 23(2)
GWB because Salzgitter could neither actually control Sachs nor was the necessary 25% voting
stock threshold reached. The Sachs family announced that it intends to retain a majority interest
in the business. Sflddeutsche Zeitung, Nov. 6, 1978, at 10, col. 2. Since then Sachs acquired the
Gas Spring Corp., Ohio, with annual sales of DM 30 million, and founded Fichtel & Sachs, Aus-
tria. Slddeutsche Zeitung, June 1, 1979, at 29, col. 2.
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B. Comment on the GKN-Sachs Decision
The Sachs decision adopts the view that additional financial
strength gained by merger which is likely to be perceived by actual and
potential competitors as a further reason not to compete vigorously
against a leading oligopolist constitutes the strengthening of a market-
dominating position. The Supreme Court refused to require a finding
that such effects would occur immediately or even that competition
would deteriorate in the future. Rather, the decisive element appeared
to be that the merger would reduce the chances for the reappearance of
price competition over the long run in a market which had not exper-
ienced price competition for many years. In such a tight oligopoly as
the German clutch market, the door had to be kept open as widely as
possible to the reappearance of competition from existing competitors
or the entry of new competitors. At first glance, this approach bears a
striking resemblance to American "entrenchment" theory as developed
in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co.,178 but as will
become clear after a comparison of the decisions, the German decision
is more far-reaching.
In Procter & Gamble, the largest manufacturer of laundry deter-
gents in the United States, Procter & Gamble, acquired Clorox, which
held 48% of the liquid bleach market and was subject to competition
from only much smaller competitors. 179 Hence, Clorox held a domi-
nant position in the liquid bleach market. Yet, Clorox was no con-
glomerate giant like the acquiror, Procter. Clorox was a one-product
company with annual sales of only $40 million while Procter sold over
$1 billion per year in a variety of product markets. After Justice Doug-
las emphasized that section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed to arrest
anticompetitive effects of market power in their incipiency and that an
examination is required of the merger's impact on competition, present
and future, he declared in what has become known as the "entrench-
ment" theory, "the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the
smaller, but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the com-
petitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dis-
suading the smaller firms from aggressively competing."'' 80 This is
resonant with the German Supreme Court's theory that the addition of
GKN's financial strength to Sachs would discourage the renewal of
178 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
179 Market shares of competitors are given in the Court of Appeals decision, 358 F.2d 74, 79
(6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
180 386 U.S. at 578.
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price competition from existing or potential entrants at some time in
the future.
But the similarities between the two cases end at that point. The
sole anticompetitive effect in the Sachs case was the likelihood that
both existing and potential competitors would in the future be less
likely to compete vigorously with the acquiree because of its increased
financial strength. The German Supreme Court relied on its own eco-
nomic theory rather than on current or historical evidence combined
with theory to predict future competitive developments.
In Procter & Gamble, on the other hand, the United States
Supreme Court focused on specific ways in which increased financial
resources were actually likely to be utilized to damage the competitive
process, based in part on actual conduct. 1 ' Although the American
and German Supreme Courts insisted that no present effects need be
proved to prohibit the respective mergers, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted, for instance, that after the Procter-Clorox merger Clorox had
actually reduced prices, offered premiums, and increased advertising to
stave off new entry based on price competition. 8 2 More importantly,
new entrants would be reluctant to compete against Clorox because the
massive resources of Procter & Gamble could be utilized in a decisively
advantageous way, te., through advertising, the "major competitive
weapon in the successful marketing of bleach,"'' 83 to meet the short-
term threat of a new entrant. An independent Clorox would not have
enough resources at its disposal for such campaigns. Hence, the Court
found concrete ways in which the acquiror's financial resources had
actually been used and probably would continue to be used to discour-
age existing and potential entrants. The German Supreme Court, on
the other hand, was not concerned about whether additional financial
resources would actually be used to stifle competition. Rather, it was
concerned about how existing and potential competitors perceived the
way in which these resources could be used against them-certainly a
much more narrow basis on which to prohibit a merger.' 84
A no less dramatic difference between the decisions is that the
Procter & Gamble case found an additional ground for prohibiting
Procter's acquisition of Clorox: Procter's status as most likely potential
entrant into the acquiree's market. That is, Procter appeared to be the
greatest threat of independent entry into the liquid bleach market
181 Id.
182 386 U.S. at 579 n.3.
183 386 U.S. at 579.
184 71 BGHZ at 119-22, WuW/E BGH at 1508-10.
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based on Procter's successful independent entry into other markets, its
active program of diversification into related product lines, the proxim-
ity of liquid bleach to its existing products (the result of selling to the
same customers through the same channels of distribution and adver-
tising and merchandising in the same manner), and the low cost and
technical ease of entry into the liquid bleach market. 85
No such examination was undertaken of the probability of in-
dependent entry by GKN into the German clutch market. If such an
examination would have been made in the Sachs case, it probably
would have revealed GKN as the most likely entrant into the German
clutch market. Of Europe's nine clutch manufacturers, four were
under common control and two were in-house producers. Ferodo of
France, Europe's largest clutch producer, owned 37% interests in both
LuK of Germany and Fraymon of Spain and a 100% interest in Valeo
of Italy.'86 Because one of these holdings, LuK, was already present in
the German market, it was highly unlikely any other members of the
Ferodo group would stir up competition there. Two other clutch man-
ufacturers, Opel and Fiat, produced in-house only for their own needs,
and hence posed no immediate competitive threat. The only remaining
producers were Borg & Beck of Britain, which was already exporting
very small quantities to the German market, and GKN and Sachs, the
merger partners. 87 Thus, GKN was the sole remaining European
clutch manufacturer not yet in the German market for which there
were no apparent obstacles to entry.
And just as importantly, there appeared to be objective motives for
GKN to desire to enter the German market. Automotive production
was expanding in Germany while it was falling in Britain. GKN was
already a clutch manufacturer in Britain, so new investment could be
kept to a minimum by simply exporting to the German market. GKN's
larger British competitor, Borg & Beck, had already demonstrated the
feasibility of this approach by its exports to Germany. Even if export-
ing proved unfeasible, GKN's decision to establish a new manufactur-
ing facility for automatic drive train components in the United States
indicated its ability to advance the necessary investment capital for a
facility in Germany. Finally, GKN already had supply contacts with
the German automotive manufacturers through its existing German
subsidiary, Unicardan, which itself had built special clutches until
185 386 U.S. at 580.





The German Supreme Court acknowledged that it was aware of
the possibility of GKN as a potential independent entrant, but it could
not consider this issue because the Cartel Office did not employ this as
a basis for prohibiting the merger. 89 Instead, the Cartel Office was
attempting to establish a pure entrenchment doctrine based exclusively
on high market share combined with increased financial power. It did
not fully succeed because the German Supreme Court required at least
a prognosis about how financial power could be used in the future.
The German prognosis, however, appears to be substantially less rigor-
ous than its American counterpart. The Procter & Gamble decision
rests upon discouragement of competition based on financial strength
which had been and could be used in the future for price cutting and
advertising plus loss of the acquiror as the most likely potential entrant.
The German Supreme Court, on the other hand, was satisfied with
probable discouragement of future price competition based solely on
competitors' perceptions that increased financial strength could be used
against them supported by a believability factor that such financial
strength would be used because the acquiror was a conglomerate enter-
prise engaged in closely related product lines and therefore would not
idly watch erosion of its market position in any part of the automotive
market. Depending on how one chooses to view the Sachs decision, it
can be concluded either that the German Supreme Court appropriately
advanced merger control doctrine by focusing on the very heart of the
entrenchment theory, or that it failed to recognize the need for finding
specific, concrete and predictable anticompetitive effects. In any event,
the German Supreme Court has provided the Cartel Office with a pow-
erful weapon in fighting one field of conglomerate acquisitions: a vir-
tual per se prohibition against the acquisition by a financially stronger
enterprise of a smaller enterprise holding a clearly dominant position
in a closely related market.
C The Erdgas Schwaben Joint Venture
In Erdgas Schwaben,'90 the Cartel Office challenged an agreement
188 This part of the opinion is not printed in either BGHZ or WuW. It is found in the Court's
original BGH slip op. KVR 4/77 at 6.
189 71 BGHZ at 113, WuW/E BGH at 1505. The Cartel Office intentionally avoided the argu-
ment that GKN was a potential independent entrant because GKN's German subsidiary, Uni-
cardin, sold off its small clutch manufacturing to LuK in 1971, and because GKN claimed it
wanted to buy Sachs for its superior technical capabilities. Both of these appeared to be strong
arguments against GKN eventually entering the German clutch market on its own.
190 - BGHZ , WuW/E BGH 1533.
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between three utilities serving Swabia, a county within the German
state Bavaria, to establish a joint venture in equal partnership to be
known as "Erdgas Schwaben GmbH" for the purpose of supplying nat-
ural gas throughout Swabia. The three joint venture partners were
Lech-Elektrizitaitswerke AG (LEW), an electric utility directly serving
640,000 inhabitants and indirectly serving 686,000 of the total 1.5 mil-
lion living in Swabia; the Aktiengesellschaft fir Licht und Kraftver-
sorgung (LK), a gas and electric utility serving small and medium sized
towns in Swabia; and the City of Augsburg, which ran its own utility
for supplying electricity, gas, water, and heat to its residents and those
in nearby areas.19'
The Cartel Office prohibited the Erdgas Schwaben joint venture
on two grounds. First, it would place the supply of gas and electricity
to much of Swabia under the common ownership of the electric utility,
LEW, which might influence the joint venture not to introduce gas to
compete effectively with its electricity. Stated in terms of the German
law, the joint venture would strengthen the market-dominating posi-
tion of LEW as a supplier of electricity by hindering potential competi-
tion between gas and electricity suppliers in Swabia.' 92 Second,
establishment of the joint venture created Erdgas Schwaben as the
dominant supplier of gas in Swabia and prevented two of the joint ven-
ture partners, LEW and LK, from independently seeking to construct
new gas facilities. LEW, the largest of the three partners, had even
stated during its discussions with the Cartel Office that if the merger
were prohibited, it would want to construct a gas utility of its own in
Swabia. Thus, it was clearly a likely independent entrant into the gas
market. The Cartel Office also concluded LK, already a gas utility, was
likely to expand its gas services into new areas because of its substantial
existing commitment to this sector and because it had the available
financial means to expand. 3 The Cartel Office determined its compet-
itive objectives could be achieved by excluding LEW from the joint
venture. Thus, LEW alone was required to withdraw while LK and the
City of Augsburg were permitted to continue the Erdgas Schwaben
venture. The Court of Appeals affirmed'94 and the case was appealed
to the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).
The Supreme Court considered three principal issues: whether
191 This part of the opinion is not printed in WuW. It is found in the Court's original BGH slip
op. KVR 6/77 at 3-5.
192 Erdgas Schwaben, WuW/E BKartA 1647, 1647-49 (1976).
193 Id. at 1649-50.
194 Erdgas Schwaben, WuW/E OLG 1895 (1977).
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merger control could be applied to the county Swabia as a "substantial
part" of Germany within the meaning of section 24(8)(3) GWB;
whether the relevant product market had been properly drawn; and
whether under section 24(1) GWB the merger could be justified despite
its anticompetitive effects based on resulting improvements in competi-
tive conditions which outweighed the disadvantages of the market
domination. The easiest of these issues was the question of whether the
geographic scope of the merger was sufficient to justify application of
the merger control provisions. LEW's entire service area included 1.3
million residents and over 3000 square miles, roughly the county Swa-
bia in the state of Bavaria. LEW was also the eighteenth largest electric
utility out of some 676 in Germany and was owned by Germany's larg-
est electricity concern, so the strengthening of its dominant position
would have a substantial impact within Germany. The Supreme Court
rejected arguments that the regions directly affected by the merger were
only those parts of Swabia LEW served directly with some half as
many residents and two-thirds the land area or the even smaller region
to be served by the newly-formed joint venture. The Court took the
view that the effects of the merger were likely to be felt throughout
LEW's direct and indirect service areas, particularly by influencing the
investment decisions made by the joint venture partners about whether
Erdgas Schwaben would build in areas LEW served with electricity.
Further, the joint venture involved an effect that was of broader signifi-
cance, in view of the relationship between substitutable energy sources
and the grant of utility monopolies which necessarily causes a high
level of concentration and excludes competition between energy suppli-
ers in neighboring markets. 95
Definition of the relevant product market posed far greater
problems. The Cartel Office had determined the relevant product mar-
ket to be electricity generally, and the Court of Appeals had deter-
mined it to be energy used for certain household purposes (cooking and
hot water but not home heating). The Supreme Court noted that more
than 80% of the uses to which electricity is put cannot be fulfilled by
other forms of energy, most notably in industrial uses. However, there
was substantial direct competition between electricity and gas as an en-
ergy source for other major uses, particularly for heating, cooking, and
hot water. The Supreme Court ruled that while the boundaries of a
product market are determined as a rule by those kinds of goods or
services that appear to be substitutable, and are in fact substitutable,
195 - BGHZ __ WuW/E BGH at 1541-42.
419
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:371(1979)
this approach does not require limiting the enquiry to only that portion
of a market in which electricity is subject to competition from other
energy sources.
Strict division of the electricity market from the standpoint of use for light
and heat for various purposes of use by operation of the required energy
transformers and limitation of the examination to those market segments
neglects the meaningful enterprise-related fact that LEW is subject to no
competition in 80% of its utility services because of a lack of competition
in the industry and for technical reasons.!
9 6
Hence, the Supreme Court found electricity generally as the relevant
product market.
Turning to the effects of the joint venture, the Court found that in
those areas of Swabia in which LEW was already the dominant sup-
plier of electricity, LEW's dominant position would be strengthened in
the electricity market as a whole as well as in those market segments in
which oil and gas presented substitutes. Although LEW was only a
one-third partner in the joint venture, "LEW would be in the position
to channel its decisions to correspond to a certain degree to its own
interests through influencing other partners and refusing its necessary
concurrence and thereby to restrain competition from gas as a substi-
tute [for electricity]."'9 7 This ability to prevent the construction of new
gas lines was a sufficient strengthening of LEW's market-dominant po-
sition to prohibit the merger even though defendants claimed gas could
be a substitute for electricity in less than 4% of all electric power
uses. 198 It was particularly important that competition be preserved be-
tween independent electricity and gas utilities because of the high level
of market concentration and local monopolies of utilities.
The central issue of the Erdgas Schwaben case focused on the
"balancing clause" of section 24(1): would the joint venture's pro-com-
petitive effect of establishing a strong gas utility to compete with other
available energy sources outweigh the anticompetitive effects of
strengthening LEW's already dominant position as an electric utility
and establishing a new gas utility that would be market-dominating?
The Court was confronted with two possible interpretations of the bal-
ancing clause: first, that the merger can be justified if competitive con-
ditions are likely to be better after the merger than before; and second,
that the merger can be justified only if competitive conditions are likely
to be better after the merger than before, and that an equal improve-
196 Id. at 1535-36.
197 Id. at 1536.
198 fd. at 1537.
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ment in competitive conditions is not likely to have occurred without
the merger. The Supreme Court chose the second view, which had
been adopted by the Court of Appeals, and concluded further that the
burden of proof rested on the defendants:
It is part of the merging enterprises' burden of proof to show that the
expected improvements in the conditions of competition through the ac-
tivities of the joint venture will be possible only with the mergr accompa-
nied by the strengthening of its market position. The Federal Cartel
Office as well as the participating enterprises have pointed out that proof
of particular future competitive developments in the described manner
could only be made in detail with difficulty from their standpoint because
it depends mainly on the basically incalculable individual conduct of en-
terprises in the future. This point of view must be taken into account. It
is sufficient, if it can be said with high likelihood on the basis of relation-
ships in the market at present or in the future on the basis on concrete
circumstances according to general experience with economic behavior
that a similar improvement of competitive conditions is not likely without
the merger.
199
Thus, in this case it had to be shown that the Erdgas Schwaben joint
venture would not only have pro-competitive effects, but also that the
construction of a gas utility of the size and scope of Erdgas Schwaben
would not be likely to occur as quickly and effectively without the joint
venture.
The Cartel Office maintained that the gas facilities already built by
Erdgas Schwaben would continue in use and be expanded even if
LEW's joint participation in the venture were prohibited, and that both
LEW and LK would likewise continue to use and expand their own
existing gas facilities. LEW would be prepared to build up a gas utility
in Swabia in particular on account of its existing capabilities and its
declaration of intent to do so during the Cartel Office proceedings.
LEW countered that in any event it could not build up as quickly and
effectively alone as by the joint venture. The other partner in the joint
venture which the Cartel Office labelled as a likely potential entrant,
LK, argued that alone it could not effectively enter the gas market.
Only establishing an operation of optimal size combined with a sharing
of the high risks would assure that gas effectively competed against
oil.2 The joint venture partners also maintained that the participation
of LEW made substantial rationalization advantages possible for pipe-
lines and rights of way, connections for gas supplies, technical service,
customer relationships, organization and storage space.20 1
199 Id. at 1540.
200 Id. at 1540-41.
201 Id. at 1541.
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The Supreme Court conceded that the participation of LEW might
well bring real advantages that would assure that "gas will enter into
competition with oil more quickly and effectively than would be the
case without the merger,"202 but it declined to make a final judgment.
Instead it reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to hear fur-
ther evidence from an expert witness about whether, without the ra-
tionalization advantages gained from LEW's participation in the joint
venture, a similar improvement in competitive conditions between oil
and gas would be likely, and issued this instruction:
Should it be shown that the competitive conditions in the heating market
will be improved more quickly and effectively on the basis of the supply
of gas by Erdgas Schwaben, then the Court of Appeals will have to ex-
amine whether the improvements brought about by this cooperation out-
weigh its accompanying disadvantages, namely the strengthening of
LEW's market-dominating position, or even the creation of a market-
dominating position by Erdgas Schwaben.2°3
The ultimate decision by the Court of Appeals, which might be made
in early 1980, should provide further useful guidance on how the "bal-
ancing clause" is to be applied in practice.204
D. Comment on Erdgas Schwaben
The American law intervenes at a lower threshold of damage to
the competitive process than does the German law, namely when a
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. Despite the apparently harsher American standard, the
Erdgas Schwaben decision indicates that the German law may develop
a similarly rigorous standard. This will depend in great measure on
how the balancing clause is interpreted.
Roughly comparable American merger decisions from the 1960's
indicate that the Erdgas Schwaben joint venture would probably be
struck down in the United States. United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas205 is such a case. The Supreme Court required El Paso, which
supplied 75% of all gas to the California market, to divest its acquisi-
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 After this article was submitted to the printer, settlement negotiations began in Erdgas
Schwaben. LEW has offered to reduce its participation in the joint-venture from 33% to 23%, thus
reducing its control below the 25% level defined as a merger under GWB § 23(2)(2). However,
this could still constitute a merger under GWB § 23(2)(5). See text accompanying notes 23-26
supra. In any event, the Cartel Office may accept the reduction in LEW's influence over the joint-
venture as sufficient to meet its competitive concerns. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 16,
1979, at 16, col. 15.
205 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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tion of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Company. Pacific Northwest was
considered a very likely independent entrant into California because it
was the only nearby supplier of natural gas not yet in that market, and
because before the merger it had attempted independently to negotiate
a supply agreement with Southern California Edison. Only El Paso's
responding price concessions prevented Pacific Northwest from suc-
cessful entry. The Supreme Court declared that:
We would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a
powerful influence on El Paso's business attitudes within the State. We
repeat that one purpose of § 7 was "to arrest the trend toward concentra-
tion, the tendency to monopolize, before the consumers' alternatives dis-
appeared through the merger ..... 206
The facts of ElPaso were more suited to prohibition than those of
Erdgas Schwaben. El Paso not only involved a simple take-over,
rather than a joint venture, which creates a new competitive force, but
also the acquiror's business strategies actually had been affected by the
acquiree. The case is nevertheless a strong declaration against acquisi-
tion of a clearly proven potential competitor. To this extent, the case
parallels Erdgas Schwaben, for there LK and Augsburg were already
gas suppliers and LEW was a self-admitting likely independent entrant
into the gas market.
The first joint venture case to be decided by the Supreme Court
under section 7 of the Clayton Act, United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.,207 turned exclusively on potential competition analysis. The
Court struck down a joint venture between Pennsalt and Olin Mathie-
son designed to establish a new facility for the manufacture and sale of
sodium chlorate in the southeastern United States market, where a
tight oligopoly existed. Pennsalt had 57.8% of the market in sodium
chlorate west of the Rocky Mountains and had sold substantial quanti-
ties of sodium chlorate in the target southeast market, principally on
the basis of a sales agency contract with the other joint venture partner,
Olin .2 s Therefore, this was basically a geographic extension merger
for Pennsalt. Olin, on the other hand, did not produce sodium chlorate
at all, but by virtue of its sales agency contract accounted for 8.9% of all
sodium chlorate sales in the southeast. °9 Only two other suppliers
competed in the oligopolistic southeastern market. The district court
had found that Pennsalt and Olin were each capable of building its
206 376 U.S. at 659.
207 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
208 Id. at 162.
209 Id. at 164.
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own plant, but concluded it was unlikely that both Pennsalt and Olin
would enter the southeast independently. The court, therefore, permit-
ted the joint venture.2"
The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, requiring further investi-
gation of anticompetitive effects:
Certainly the sole test would not be the probability that both companies
would have entered the market. Nor would the consideration be limited
to the probability that one entered alone. There still remained for consid-
eration the fact that Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the
corporation that might have remained at the edge of the market, continu-
ally threatening to enter . . . . The existence of an aggressive, well
equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related
lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market
would be a substantial incentive to competition which can not be underes-
timated.2 1
Thus, the joint venture could be a violation not only if it prevented
both firms from independent entry, but also if one firm would have
entered independently while the other exercised a restraining influence
on the oligopoly market by standing in the wings ready to enter at any
time.
In Erdgas Schwaben, the German Supreme Court appears to take
a more lenient attitude toward joint ventures than that in Penn-Olin.
The Court seems to begin with the premise that if the joint venture
prevents both LEW, on the one hand, and LK and Augsburg together,
on the other, from independently entering the gas market. This may
make the Erdgas Schwaben joint venture unlawful, but not automati-
cally. A further balancing test has to be made as to whether the joint
venture will improve the competitive environment, such as by making
gas available more quickly and effectively as a new energy source, than
without the joint venture. This aspect is totally lacking in the Penn-
Olin analysis.
The closest American case to Erdgas Schwaben is Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,212 in which a joint venture be-
tween Canadian and American natural gas companies was prohibited
under the potential competition doctrine. Trans-Canada Gas wanted
to transport natural gas from the Canadian border in northern Minne-
sota through Wisconsin and Michigan to Ontario to meet the increas-
ing demand for gas in eastern Canada. A United States route promised
the advantages of being more economical to build and expanding
210 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
211 378 U.S. at 173-74.
212 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Trans-Canada's exports to the United States. Trans-Canada attempted
but failed to negotiate a joint project with several United States compa-
nies, including American Natural, the dominant supplier of gas in Wis-
consin and Michigan. It then submitted a proposal to the Federal
Power Commission for constructing its own pipeline in competition
with proposals from the complainant, Northern Natural, and a joint
venture between American Natural and Midwestern Gas.
Before the Commission reviewed the proposals, American Natural
and Midwestern Gas reached a joint venture agreement with Trans-
Canada, withdrew their competing proposal and adopted Trans-Can-
ada's. The Federal Power Commission accepted the Trans-Canada
joint venture proposal and rejected the sole remaining proposal from
Northern Natural, the sole bidder left out of the joint venture.213
Northern Natural then filed suit complaining that this last-minute joint
venture effectively eliminated potential competition between Trans-Ca-
nada and the already dominant American Natural.
The Court of Appeals accepted this argument in view of the fact
that American Natural already supplied over 50% of the natural gas in
Michigan and Wisconsin, and that Trans-Canada's original proposal
contemplated sales of gas in this very area.2 4 Further, it appeared
probable that if Trans-Canada entered alone, it would seek to sell its
excess gas in parts of northern Michigan not yet served by natural gas,
and that American Natural would also choose to compete for that mar-
ket.215
The position of American Natural as the dominant supplier of gas
was somewhat comparable to that of LEW, the dominant electricity
supplier in the Erdgas Schwaben case. Both were dominant suppliers
within the geographic market in which the joint venture would operate.
Both saw that expansion in the natural gas field was likely and chose to
participate in that expansion in a manner affording a significant ability
to protect their existing business from the competitive threat of that
expansion.
In Erdgas Schwaben, the Cartel Office was particularly interested
in establishing a principle that competing forms of energy should be
kept in separate hands to foster competition between them.216 It is
213 Id. at 962.
214 Id. at 963.
215 Id.
216 This is based on discussions with officials of the German Cartel Office. The same rationale
was used in BP-Gelsenberg, WuW/E BKartA 1719 (1978), merger authorization granted, WuW/E
BWM 165 (1979).
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noteworthy in this connection that in 1975 only one-third of the entire
German public had gas available and the market was expanding rap-
idly.217 Hence, under the Cartel Office's reasoning it was a new source
of energy which should be expanded to offer price competition to elec-
tricity and oil. Evidence produced at trial indicated the Cartel Office's
hopes for price competition were unrealistically high. The competitive
overlap between gas and oil was only 4% of the entire electricity mar-
ket, hardly a significant threat to LEW's electricity sales.2" 8 Further,
LEW probably would not care about losing electricity profit to gas if
gas were equally as profitable as electricity: the profits would merely
pass through different hands but ultimately arrive in the same pocket.
LEW's participation in Erdgas Schwaben, a monopolist, would tend to
assure that very result.
The retrial will focus on the questions of whether the joint venture
would tend to develop the gas market in Swabia faster and more effec-
tively than if the joint venture were not permitted, and if so whether the
improvements brought about by the joint venture outweigh its accom-
panying disadvantages, namely the strengthening of LEW's dominant
position in the electricity market and the creation of Erdgas Schwaben
with a dominant position in the natural gas market. The Supreme
Court considered it likely that LEW's participation in the joint venture
would lead to substantial rationalization advantages in the form of
rights of way and centralized administration that might make it possi-
ble for gas to enter into more effective competition with oil and electric-
ity. It suggested that on remand proof of rationalization advantages
could be provided by an expert witness, and that the future competitive
developments derived in part from these advantages could be predicted
"according to general experience with economic behavior." While pro-
viding proof of the probable savings from rationalization measures is
feasible, predicting their future competitive impact is another matter.
It is doubtful that the Court's suggestion of simply making a pre-
diction of future competitive developments based on general economic
experience will simplify matters; in any event that prediction will have
to be based on a detailed examination of the specific plans of the Erd-
gas Schwaben joint venture and the likely alternative plans of the
217 Of all primary energy used, natural gas sources was only 0.8% in 1964, 10% in 1973, and
13.8% in 1975, when entire regions of West Germany, including northern Schleswig-Holstein,
eastern Lower Saxony, western Rhineland-Palatinate, and northeastern and southern Bavaria
(which includes Swabia) still had not been linked to a gas network. HAUPrGUTACHTEN DER
MONOPOLKOMMISSION I: MEHR WETTBEWERB IST MOGLICH $% 615, 618, at 330-31 (1977).
218 - BGHZ _ WuW/E BGH at 1537.
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members of the joint venture in the event LEW is excluded from par-
ticipation. If concrete alternative plans do not exist, then the Court will
have to guess at unspecified and perhaps unspecifiable alternatives,
such as independent entry of LEW while LK and Augsburg also enter
as partners, entry of only LEW, entry of only LK and Augsburg as
partners, or failure of any one of them to enter. This is sure to present
elaborate and frustrating problems of proof.
Even assuming that a prediction of future competitive develop-
ments can be made and the net results of the joint venture are
favorable, there remains the task of balancing that net favorable impact
against the strengthening of LEW's dominant position in the electricity
market as well as the creation of Erdgas Schwaben as a monopolist in
the gas market. The Court provides no guidance on how to balance the
future advantages and disadvantages of a rationalized monopoly that
will rapidly enter the gas market but which may have less competitive
zeal because of close connections to a competing form of energy versus
the slower future entry of a smaller, less rationalized gas supplier or
suppliers that are more likely to adopt a competitive attitude.
The American courts have already become caught in a difficult
balancing snare in judging potential competition cases.219 The formu-
lation of reasonable, clear, workable balancing rules is the great chal-
lenge which lies before the courts in this field on both sides of the
Atlantic. It can only be hoped that the German Court of Appeals will
shed new light on this area, but there is sound reason to remain skepti-
cal about its prospects for mastering the challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
German merger control has developed at a rapid pace. Some 23
mergers had been formally prohibited from the time of the law's enact-
ment until the end of 1978.220 In the same period two major Supreme
Court decisions and five Economics Ministry decisions were issued.
Vigorus application of the law is promoted by the body of merger in-
219 For discussion of the problems of potential competition analysis in judging mergers, see
Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under § 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and To-
morrow's Legislation, 58 B.U. L. REv. 199 (1978); Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: .4
Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977); Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the
Antitrust Laws: .4 Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453 (1976); Davidow, Conglomer-
ate Concentration and Section Severn The Limitations ofthe Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1231 (1968); Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections On the Signf-
cance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1969); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1965).
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formation triggered by the reporting provisions, the Cartel Office's ac-
tive enforcement efforts, and a climate of opinion against permitting
further market concentration. Despite the law, the merger movement
continues. Still, it cannot be said that German merger control has been
ineffective. The very existence of the reporting requirement and the
possibility of prohibiting mergers leads to a business consciousness that
mergers are subject to antitrust risk which tends to rechannel merger
enthusiasm into less anticompetitive types of take-overs.
The law has weaknesses, but they have not been overlooked by the
Monopolies Commission, which is required by statute to issue a report
on concentration developments in Germany every two years and pro-
pose useful changes in the law. In order to strengthen the law, the
Government submitted a draft amendment"2 ' dated May 17, 1978.
Some major aspects of the proposal, are:
1. Amend the reporting provisions of section 23(2) so that in
making the calculation of the seller's market share, employees and
turnover, the wording makes clear that only those related to the assets
being sold are considered; also amend the definition of merger so that
the acquisition of less than 25% of the voting capital will be considered
to be a merger if that holding combined with contractual or other rela-
tionships between the parties effectively gives the acquiror the same
degree of control as if he held 25% of the voting capital.
2. Add a new section 23a to introduce a rebuttable presumption
that a merger creates or strengthens a market-dominating position (i.e.,
a presumptive violation) if:
-An enterprise with turnover of at least DM 2 billion merges with an-
other enterprise that:
i. is active in a market in which medium-sized or small businesses
represent two-thirds of the market and the merging enterprises
would hold at least 5% of that market, or
ii. is dominant in one or more markets which has a turnover of at
least DM 100 million; or
-The participating enterprises have a combined turnover of at least DM
10 billion and at least two of the merging enterprises had a turnover of
at least DM 1 billion.
3. Amend the minimum size and impact criteria of section 24(8)
to exempt from merger control only those mergers in which:
-The participating enterprises had a combined turnover of less than DM
500 million; or
-An independent enterprise with turnover of less than DM 50 million is
221 Gesetzentwurfder Bundesregierung: Eniwurfeines vierlen Gesetzes zurJ4nderung des Gesetzes
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Sept. 27, 1978, at 4-5, BT-Drucks. 8/2136.
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acquired, but the exemption would not apply if the acquiree had a
turnover of DM 2 million or greater and the acquiror had a turnover of
at least DM 1 billion; or
-The affected market has a turnover of less than DM 10 million in each
of the preceding five years.222
These amendments would serve to do more than merely close
loopholes in the law. The proposed section 23a might be a first step
toward shifting the focus of German merger control away from the
market domination principle to size criteria alone in the case of large-
firm mergers. This is an approach for which the Cartel Office has been
lobbying for some time.
The German merger control law is developing rapidly through the
enforcement activities of the Cartel Office, decisions of the courts and
legislative changes. It is not window-dressing but rather the most dy-
namic force in merger control outside the United States. Its drafting,
enforcement, and interpretation have borrowed heavily from the
American experience; but it is clearly setting its own independent
course. Now perhaps Americans, as well as Europeans, will find useful
ideas developing in the German experience from which they in return
will be able to borrow.
- 222 Id.
APPENDIX I
GWB §§ 22-24, 46*
Sec. 22. Market-Dominating Enterprises
(I) An enterprise is market-dominating within the meaning of this law if it,
as a supplier or purchaser of a certain kind of goods or commercial serv-
ices:
1. has no competitors or is not subject to any substantial competition;
or
2. has a commanding market position in relation to its competitors; in
this connection, in addition to its market share, and in particular its
financial strength, its access to supply and sales markets, its links
with other enterprises as well as legal or factual barriers to the entry
of other enterprises into the market are to be taken into considera-
tion.
(2) Two or more enterprises are also deemed to be market-dominating inso-
far as, for factual reasons, substantial competition for a certain kind of
goods or commercial services does not exist between them, either gener-
ally or in certain markets, and insofar as they jointly fulfill the condi-
tions of subsection (1).
(3) It is presumed that:
1. an enterprise is market-dominating within the meaning of subsec-
tion (1) if it has a market share of at least one-third for a certain
kind of goods or commercial services; this presumption does not ap-
ply if the enterprise had a turnover of less than DM 250 million
during the last completed business year;
2. the conditions of subsection (2) are fulfilled if, with respect to a cer-
tain kind of goods or commercial services:
a) three or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of 50
percent or more; or
b) five or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of two-
thirds or more;
this presumption does not apply insofar as enterprises are concerned
which had a turnover of less than DM 100 million during the last
completed business year.
§ 23(1), sentences 2 to 7, apply analogously to the computation of
market shares and turnover.
* Authors' translation. For alternate translations of the GWB, see COMPETITION LAW IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A., vol. A*, at GER.L.-I (D. Gjilstra & F. Murphy ed. 1977);
OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1976); R. MUELLER & H.
SCHNEIDER, THE GERMAN LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION: BILINGUAL EDITION
WITH INTRODUCTION (1973); and A. RIESENKAMPFF & J. GREs, LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF
COMPETITION: TEXT AND COMMENTARY IN GERMAN AND ENGLISH (1977).
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(4) In regard to market-dominating enterprises, the Cartel Authority shall
have the powers referred to in subsection (5) insofar as such enterprises
abuse their market-dominating position in the market for these or other
goods or commercial services.
(5) Under the conditions of subsection (4), the Cartel Authority may pro-
hibit abusive conduct of market-dominating enterprises and declare
agreements to be ineffective; § 19 applies analogously. Prior thereto, the
Cartel Authority should call upon the participants to cease and desist
from the abuse to which objection was raised.
(6) Insofar as the conditions of subsection (1) are fulfilled by a combine
enterprise (Konzernunternehmen) within the meaning of § 18 of the
Stock Corporation Act, the Cartel Authority may exercise its powers
under subsection (5) with respect to each enterprise in the combine.
§ 23
(1) A merger of enterprises shall be reported to the Federal Cartel Office
without undue delay if:
1. within the entire territory in which this law applies or within a sub-
stantial part thereof, a market share of at least 20% is reached or
increased as a result of the merger, or if a participating enterprise
has a market share of at least 20% in another market; or
2. the participating enterprises had collectively at any one time during
the last business year preceding the merger at least 10,000 employ-
ees, or during such period had a turnover of at least DM 500 mil-
lion.
If one of the participating enterprises constitutes a controlled or a con-
trolling enterprise within the meaning of § 17 of the Stock Corporation
Act or a combine enterprise (Konzernunternehmen) within the meaning
of § 18 of the Stock Corporation Act, then the enterprises linked in this
manner are deemed to be a single enterprise for purposes of computing
market shares, number of employees and turnover; if several enterprises,
on the basis of an agreement or otherwise, act together in such a manner
that they can jointly exercise a controlling influence over a participating
enterprise, then each of them is deemed to be a controlling enterprise.
Sections 158(1) and (2) of the Stock Corporation Act apply to the com-
putation of turnover; turnover from sales and services between the en-
terprises which are connected within the meaning of sentence 2 (internal
turnover), as well as value-added tax and excise duties, shall not be
taken into consideration; turnover in foreign currencies shall be con-
verted into German marks (DM) at the official exchange rate. With re-
spect to credit institutions and building and loan associations, there
shall be substituted for turnover one-tenth of the total assets of the last
completed business year, and in respect to insurance companies, pre-
mium income received during the last completed business year. The
total assets shall be reduced by those items which reflect holdings in
affiliated enterprises within the meaning of sentence 2; premium income
shall be the income from the insurance and reinsurance business, in-
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cluding amounts ceded to reinsurers. For enterprises whose business
consists in whole or in part of distribution of goods, only three-fourths
of the turnover shall be taken into consideration. For enterprises whose
business consists in whole or in part of printing, or in the publishing or
distribution of newspapers or periodicals or their constituent parts, their
turnover shall be multiplied by a factor of twenty. Sentence 6 remains
unaffected.
(2) The following transactions are deemed to be a merger within the mean-
ing of this law:
1. the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of another enterprise in
whole or in substantial part by consolidation, transformation or
other means;
2. the acquisition of shares in another enterprise, if such shares alone
or together with other shares already held by the enterprise:
a) amount to 25% of the voting capital of the other enterprise; or
b) amount to 50% of the voting capital of the other enterprise; or
c) give the enterprise a majority participation within the meaning
of § 16(1) of the Stock Corporation Act.
The shares held by the enterprise are also deemed to include those
shares which are owned either by a linked enterprise within the
meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, or by another for the account
of any one of these enterprises and, if the owner of the enterprise is
a sole proprietor, also those shares which are included in other as-
sets of the owner. If several enterprises simultaneously or succes-
sively acquire shares of another enterprise to the extent described
above, this is also deemed to be a merger between the participating
enterprises (joint venture-Gemeinschaftsunternehmen) with respect
to those markets in which the other enterprise is active. If a person
or an association of persons, neither of which is an enterprise, holds
a majority participation in one enterprise and acquires shares in an-
other enterprise, to that extent he, she or it is deemed to be an enter-
prise.
3. agreements with another enterprise by means of which:
a) a combine (Konzern) within the meaning of § 18 of the Stock
Corporation Act is created, or the group composing the com-
bine is enlarged; or
b) the other enterprise obligates itself to conduct its business for
the account of the enterprise or to transfer its profits in whole or
in part to the enterprise; or
c) the business of the other enterprise is leased or otherwise trans-
ferred in whole or in part to the enterprise;
4. placing of the same persons, to the extent of at least one-half of the
members, on the supervisory board, on the board of management,
or on such other corporate organ as may be authorized to conduct
the management of enterprises;
5. any other relationship between enterprises on the basis of which one
or several enterprises are able directly or indirectly to exercise a
controlling influence on another enterprise.
(3) A merger is also presumed to exist if the participating enterprises have
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previously been merged within the meaning of subsection (2), unless the
merger does not lead to a substantial strengthening of the already-ex-
isting enterprise relationship. It does not constitute a merger if a credit
institution, in connection with the formation or capital increase of an
enterprise or otherwise in the course of its business, acquires shares of
another enterprise for the purpose of selling such shares in the market,
provided that it does not exercise voting rights arising from such shares,
and provided that the sale is made within one year; in connection with
the formation of an enterprise, the exercise of voting rights in the first
shareholders' meeting after the formation does not constitute a merger.
If an enterprise participating in a merger constitutes a linked enterprise
within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, then the controlling
enterprise as well as those enterprises by which the controlling enter-
prise is controlled are deemed to be participants in the merger. If two or
more enterprises merge, this also is deemed to be a merger of the enter-
prises they control.
(4) The report shall be required by:
1. in the case of a merger, consolidation or transformation, the owners
of the transferee enterprises or the newly-formed enterprise or their
representatives, and, in the case of legal persons or partnerships,
those persons who are authorized to act as representatives by law or
by the articles of association;
2. otherwise,
a) the owners of the enterprises participating in the merger; and
b) in the case of subsection (2), nos. I and 2, also the sellers or
their representatives, and, in the case of legal persons or part-
nerships, those persons who, by law or by the articles of associa-
tion, are authorized to act as representatives; in the cases of
letter (b), subsection (3), sentence 3, applies analogously.
(5) The form of the merger shall be indicated in the report. The report shall
further contain the following information regarding each participating
enterprise:
1. name or other designation and place of business or legal residence,
2. type of business,
3. insofar as the conditions of subsection (1), sentence 1, are fulfilled,
the market share including the basis for its computation or estima-
tion, the number of employees and the turnover; in respect of credit
institutions and building and loan associations, the total assets, and
with respect to insurance companies, the premium income shall be
substituted in place of the turnover,
4. should shares of another enterprise (subsection (2), no. 2) be ac-
quired, the amount of those acquired and of the aggregate participa-
tion.
If a participating enterprise constitutes a linked enterprise within the
meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, then the information required
pursuant to sentence 2, nos. 1 to 3, shall also be given with respect to the
enterprises so connected, and the combine (Konzern) relationships and
the controlling and participation relationships among the connected en-
terprises shall be reported.
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(6) The Federal Cartel Office may demand information from each partici-
pating enterprise regarding market shares, including the basis for their
computation or estimation, as well as turnover for a certain kind of
goods or commercial services which the enterprise realized in the last
business year preceding the merger. If a participating enterprise consti-
tutes a linked enterprise within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence
2, then the Federal Cartel Office may also demand information regard-
ing the enterprises so connected; it may also demand information from
the linked enterprises. § 46(2), (5), (8) and (9) as well as § 47 apply as
appropriate. The Federal Cartel Office shall set a reasonable time limit
for the furnishing of such information. The powers of the Federal Car-
tel Office pursuant to § 46 remain unaffected.
§24
(1) If it is likely that a market-dominating position will be created or
strengthened as a result of a merger, the Cartel Authority shall have the
powers specified in the following provisions unless the participating en-
terprises prove that the merger will also lead to improvements in the
conditions of competition and that these improvements will outweigh
the disadvantages of the market domination.
(2) If the conditions of subsection (1) are met, the Federal Cartel Office
must prohibit the merger. The Federal Cartel Office may prohibit a
merger as soon as the plan for the merger has become known to it; the
Federal Cartel Office may prohibit completed mergers only within one
year after receipt of the complete report pursuant to § 23; § 24a(2), sen-
tence 2, nos. 1 and 5-6 apply as appropriate. Prior to such prohibition
the highest authorities of the states in which the participating enterprises
maintain their legal residence shall be given the opportunity to present
their views. If the Federal Cartel Office has issued the order pursuant to
sentence 1, it is impermissible to complete the merger without permis-
sion of the Federal Minister of Economics or to participate in comple-
tion of the merger; legal transactions violating this prohibition are
invalid; this provision does not apply to agreements concerning a
merger, consolidation, transformation, integration or formation of an
enterprise nor to enterprise agreements within the meaning of §§ 291-
292 of the Stock Corporation Act once they have become legally effec-
tive by entry in the Commercial Register or the Cooperative Societies
Register. A completed merger which has been prohibited by the Fed-
eral Cartel Office shall be dissolved unless the Federal Minister of Eco-
nomics grants authorization for the merger.
(3) Upon application, the Federal Minister of Economics shall authorize
the merger if, in the case involved, the restraint of competition is com-
pensated by the overall economic advantages of the merger or if the
merger is justified by an overriding public interest; in this connection,
regard shall be given to the competitive capability of the participating
enterprises in markets outside the territory in which this law applies.
The authorization may be granted only if the extent of the restraint of
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competition does not endanger the principles of the market economy.
The authorization may be subjected to restrictions and conditions.
These may not be directed at placing the conduct of the participating
enterprises under continuous supervision. Section 22 remains unaf-
fected.
(4) The application for granting authorization for the merger shall be sub-
mitted to the Federal Minister of Economics in writing within a period
of one month. The period shall commence with the service of the order
of the Federal Cartel Office referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1; if
the order of the Federal Cartel Office is appealed within the period pro-
vided for in § 65(1), sentences 1 and 2, then the period for the applica-
tion for authorization shall commence on the date on which the order of
the Federal Cartel Office becomes final. The Federal Minister of Eco-
nomics should decide on the application within four months following
the expiration of the periods for the application for authorization re-
ferred to in sentences 1 and 2. Prior to the decision, the highest authori-
ties of the states in which the participating enterprises maintain their
legal residence shall be given an opportunity to present their views.
(5) The Federal Minister of Economics may revoke the authorization,
amend it by ordering restrictions, or subject it to conditions if the partic-
ipating enterprises contravene a duty connected with the authorization.
The Federal Minister of Economics may withdraw the authorization if
the participating enterprises have obtained it through fraud, threat,
bribery or through the furnishing of information incorrect or incomplete
in a material respect.
(6) The dissolution of a completed merger may also consist in removing the
restraint of competition in a manner other than through the re-establish-
ment of the originally prevailing conditions. The Federal Cartel Office
shall order the measures necessary for dissolution of the merger if-
1. its order referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1, has become final;
and
2. the participating enterprises had filed an application for granting
authorization with the Federal Minister of Economics and the rejec-
tion of such application or, where subsection (5) applies, the revoca-
tion or withdrawal has become final.
In so doing, while safeguarding the interests of third parties, those meas-
ures shall be ordered which accomplish the objective with the least ex-
pense and the least burden for the participants.
(7) To enforce its order, the Federal Cartel Office may in particular:
1. by imposing a non-recurring or recurring penalty of DM 10,000 to
DM 1 million, cause those required to dissolve the merger to carry
out the ordered measures without undue delay;
2. prohibit the exercise of voting rights from shares of a participating
enterprise which are held or attributed to another participating en-
terprise, or subject the exercise of such voting rights or the manner
of such exercise to permission of the Federal Cartel Office;
3. declare agreements effecting mergers as designated in § 23(2), nos. 1
and 3, to be ineffective; this does not apply to agreements concern-
ing a merger, consolidation, transformation, integration or forma-
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tion of an enterprise nor to enterprise agreements within the
meaning of §§ 291-292 of the Stock Corporation Act once they have
become legally effective through entry in the Commercial Register
or in the Cooperative Societies Register;
4. appoint a trustee for the dissolution of the merger who shall make
the required declarations for the obligated parties and carry out the
required measures to dissolve the merger; in this connection, the ex-
tent to which the rights of those concerned shall be suspended dur-
ing the duration of the fiduciary relationship shall be specified;
§§ 664 and 666-670 of the Civil Code are to be applied analogously
to the legal relationship between the trustee and such obligated par-
ties; the trustee may claim reasonable compensation from such obli-
gated parties.
(8) Subsections (1)-(7) do not apply:
I. if the participating enterprises collectively had a turnover of less
than DM 500 million during the last completed business year; or
2. if an enterprise which had a turnover during the last completed
business year of not more than DM 50 million affiliates with an-
other enterprise; or
3. insofar as it is likely that the restraint of competition will not have
effects within the entire territory in which this law applies or in a
substantial part thereof; or
4. insofar as a market for goods or commercial services is concerned
which had a sales volume of less than DM 10 million during the last
completed calendar year.
Section 23(1), sentences 2-7, are to be applied in computing turnover.
(9) Subsection (8), sentence I, nos. 2 and 3 is not applicable to the extent
that competition is restrained within the meaning of subsection 1 in the
business of printing, or in the publishing or distribution of newspapers
or periodicals or their constituent parts.
§ 24a
(1) Notification of the plan of a merger may be given to the Federal Cartel
Office. Notification of the merger plan must be given to the Federal
Cartel Office if the individual turnover of at least two of the enterprises
participating in the merger amounted to DM I billion or more during
the last completed business year; further, notification of the merger plan
must be made if the merger is to be effected pursuant to state law, by
legislative enactment or by other sovereign act. Section 23 applies anal-
ogously to the notification, provided that when § 23(1), sentence 1, no. 2,
and § 23(6) are applied, the date of the notification shall be substituted
for the date of the merger, and provided further that in cases of a
merger, consolidation or transformation, representatives or persons au-
thorized to represent the enterprises participating in the merger shall be
obligated to make the notification. The notification is deemed to be ef-
fected only if it contains the information referred to in § 23(5). Section
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46(8) and (9) as well as § 47 apply analogously to the information and
documents obtained in connection with the notification.
(2) If notification of the merger plan has been made to the Federal Cartel
Office, the Federal Cartel Office may prohibit the merger only if it in-
forms whoever has given the notification within one month after receipt
of the notification that it has undertaken an examination of the merger
plan, and further, if it issues the order pursuant to § 24(2), sentence 1,
within four months after receipt of the notification. The Federal Cartel
Office may also prohibit the merger after the expiration of the four
months if:
1. the enterprises participating in the merger have agreed to an exten-
sion of the period; or
2. the merger is completed even though the one-month period referred
to in sentence 1, or, if the Federal Cartel Office has made a commu-
nication pursuant to sentence 1, the four-month period specified
herein, has not expired; or
3. the merger is completed in a manner other than as notified; or
4. the merger has not yet been completed and the circumstances, on
the basis of which the Federal Cartel Office has refrained from mak-
ing a communication pursuant to sentence 1 or from prohibiting the
merger pursuant to § 24(2), sentence 1, have substantially changed;
or
5. the Federal Cartel Office has been caused, by incorrect or incom-
plete information given by the enterprises participating in the
merger or by another, to abstain from making communication pur-
suant to sentence 1 or from prohibiting the merger pursuant to§ 24(2), sentence 1; or
6. information pursuant to §§ 23(6) or 46 was not supplied or not sup-
plied in due time thereby causing the Federal Cartel Office to act as
referred to in no. 5.
(3) The notification of the merger plan shall not affect the obligation to re-
port the merger pursuant to § 23; in the report pursuant to § 23, refer-
ence may be made to the materials submitted in the notification of the
merger plan.
(4) If notification of a merger plan is to be made pursuant to subsection (1),
sentence 2, it is prohibited either to complete the merger or to partici-
pate in the completion of the merger prior to the expiration of the one-
month period referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1, and if the Federal
Cartel Office has made a communication pursuant to subsection (2),
sentence 1, prior to the four-month period therein referred to or its
agreed-upon extension; legal transactions violating this prohibition are
invalid; this provision does not apply to contracts concerning a merger,
consolidation, transformation, integration or formation of an enterprise
nor to enterprise agreements within the meaning of §§ 291-292 of the
Stock Corporation Act once such contracts have become legally effective
through entry in the Commercial Register or in the Cooperative Socie-
ties Register.
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§ 24b
(1) A Monopolies Commission is established to regularly give its opinion
on the developments of business concentration in the Federal Republic
of Germany and on the administration of §§ 22-24a. It shall consist of
five members who must have special knowledge and experience in the
fields of economics, business administration, social policy, technology or
commercial law.
(2) The members of the Monopolies Commission may not be members of
the government or a legislative body at the federal or state levels, or of
the civil service at the federal or state levels, or of any other legal person
formed under public law, with the exception of university professors
and members of an academic institute. Furthermore, they may not be
representatives of a business association or of an organization of em-
ployers or employees, nor have a regular employment or service con-
tract with such association or organization. Furthermore, they may not
have held such positions during the year preceding their appointment to
the Monopolies Commission.
(3) In its advisory opinion, the Monopolies Commission should assess the
prevailing status of business concentration as well as its foreseeable de-
velopment in the light of economic policy, and in particular competition
policy, and evaluate the administration of §§ 22-24a. It should also in-
dicate such amendments of the pertinent provisions of this law as it
deems to be necessary.
(4) The Monopolies Commission is bound only to the mandate established
by this law and shall carry on its activity independently. If a minority
holds dissenting views when an opinion is drafted, it may express them
in the opinion.
(5) The Monopolies Commission shall issue an opinion every two years on
or before June 30 covering the conditions prevailing during the last two
preceding full calendar years, provided that the first opinion shall be
prepared upon the expiration of the second full calendar year following
the entry into force of the Second Law to Amend the Law Against Re-
straints of Competition. In addition thereto, it may in its discretion pre-
pare additional opinions. The Federal Government may instruct the
Monopolies Commission to deliver additional opinions. The Monopo-
lies Commission shall submit the opinions to the Federal Government
without undue delay and shall publish them. The Federal Government
shall comment to the legislature on the opinions rendered pursuant to
sentence 1. The Federal Minister of Economics may also request an
expert opinion from the Monopolies Commission in individual cases
which are submitted to him for decision pursuant to § 24(3).
(6) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Federal Republic upon nomination by the Federal
Government. One member shall retire from office as of July 1 of each
year in which an opinion is to be rendered pursuant to subsection (5),
sentence 1. The order of retirement shall be determined by lot in the
first meeting of the Monopolies Commission. The President of the Fed-
eral Republic shall, upon nomination by the Federal Government, ap-
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point a new member on each such occasion for a term of four years.
Reappointments shall be permitted. The Federal Government shall
consult with the members of the Monopolies Commission before nomi-
nating new members. The members shall be entitled to retire from of-
fice by giving notice to the President of the Federal Republic. In the
event that a member retires prematurely, a new member shall be ap-
pointed for the term of office of the retired member; sentences 4 to 6
apply analogously.
(7) The decisions of the Monopolies Commission shall require the approval
of at least three members. The Monopolies Commission shall elect a
chairman from among its members. The Monopolies Commission shall
establish its own rules of procedure.
(8) The Monopolies Commission shall be provided with an office. The of-
fice's activities shall comprise the passing on and compiling of source
materials, making technical preparations of sessions of the Monopolies
Commission, and the printing and publication of the opinions as well as
handling other administrative matters as may occur.
(9) The members of the Monopolies Commission and the staff personnel
are obligated to keep discussions secret, as well as the working papers
which the Monopolies Commission has designated as confidential. The
duty of secrecy also extends to information supplied to the Monopolies
Commission and designated as confidential.
(10) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall receive a lump sum
compensation as well as reimbursement of their travelling expenses.
These shall be determined by the Federal Minister of Economics subject
to agreement by the Federal Minister of the Interior. The costs of the
Monopolies Commission shall be borne by the Federal Republic.
§ 46
(1) Insofar as necessary to perform its duties under this law, the Cartel Au-
thority may:
1. request information from enterprises and associations of enterprises
regarding their economic condition;
2. inspect and examine business documents maintained by enterprises
and associations of enterprises during normal business hours;
3. request information from business and professional associations
about their articles of association and resolutions as well as the
number and names of members to whom the resolutions are di-
rected.
(2) Owners of enterprises or their representatives, and in the case of legal
entities, partnerships and associations without legal capacity, persons
designated as representatives by law or articles of association, as well as
the representatives appointed pursuant to § 36(2), are obligated to fur-
nish requested information, to submit business records and to permit the
examination of such business records as well as entry into the offices and
business premises.
(3) Persons authorized by the Cartel Authority to carry out the examina-
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tions may enter the offices of enterprises and associations of enterprises.
The right of Article 13 of the Constitution is restricted to that extent.
(4) Searches may be conducted only pursuant to an order of the local judge
in whose district the search shall be made. Sections 306-310 and 31 la of
the Code of Criminal Procedure apply, as appropriate, to an appeal
from such an order. If danger will result from delay, the persons re-
ferred to in subsection 3 may conduct the necessary search during nor-
mal business hours without judicial order. An on-the-spot record
showing the essential results of the search shall be made which, in cases
where no judicial order was issued, shall also show the facts which led to
the assumption that danger would result from delay.
(5) The person obligated to furnish information may refuse to answer ques-
tions if the answer would expose him or one of his relatives, as defined
in § 383(l)-(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the danger of criminal
prosecution or of proceedings under the Law on Administrative Of-
fenses.
(6) The Federal Minister of Economics or the highest state authority shall
request information by means of individual written order; the Federal
Cartel Office shall make such requests by decree. The legal basis, the
subject matter, and the purpose of the request for information are to be
stated therein and a reasonable time period must be specified within
which the information is to be provided.
(7) The Federal Minister of Economics or the highest state authority shall
order examination by means of an individual written order; the Federal
Cartel Office shall make such orders by decree with the consent of the
President [of the Cartel Office]. The time, legal basis, subject matter and
purpose of the examination shall be stated in the order.
(8) Repealed.
(9) Knowledge and documents obtained by information supplied pursuant
to subsections (1)(1) and (1)(3) or by measures pursuant to subsection
(1)(2) may not be used in tax assessment proceedings or administrative
fine proceedings for minor tax or exchange control offenses as well as in
proceedings involving criminal tax or exchange control offenses; the
provisions of §§ 93, 97, 105(1), 111(5) in connection with § 105(1) as
well as § 116(1) of the Tax Code (Abgabenordnung) are not applicable
to that extent. Sentence 1 shall not apply to proceedings for criminal tax
offenses as well as connected tax assessment proceedings if there is an
overriding public interest in carrying on such proceedings, or if the per-
son required to give information or the person acting on its behalf have
willfully given false information.
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APPENDIX II
Cartel Office Announcement: Submissions in Reports and Notifications
under §§ 23 and 24a GWB*
Merger control, as introduced by the Second Amendment to the Law
Against Restraints of Competition (§§ 24 and 24a of the GWB), covers both
consummated mergers, which are to be reported to the Federal Cartel Office
without undue delay, and merger plans. The latter may be notified by the
participating enterprises to the Federal Cartel Office before consummation;
they must be notified beforehand if at least two of the participating enterprises
each had a turnover of DM 1 billion or more in the last completed business
year. Notifications, as opposed to reports, are subject to fees. A report, which
must also be prepared for merger plans that have been notified but are then
consummated, will be published in the Federal Register (Bundesanzeiger)
(§ 10(l)(5) GWB) with the names of the firms, domicile, and types of business
as well as the form of the merger. In certain circumstances, the Federal Cartel
Office will prohibit mergers. In doing so, it is bound to observe certain time
limits for issuing a decision, namely one year in the case of mergers that have
been reported and four months in the case of merger plans that have been
notified. These time limits shall begin to run upon the receipt of the fully
completed report or notification at the Federal Cartel Office.
A. Required Information
A report under § 23(1) sentence 1 GWB and a notification under § 24a (1)
sentences 1 and 2 GWB must include the information enumerated in § 23 (5)
GWB. In particular, the following details are required:
1. Information About the Merger
The report or the notification must indicate which enterprises have been
merged or are about to be merged. It shall further state in what manner the
merger shall take place (§ 23(5) sentence 1 GWB); to the extent that the
merger is based on contracts it is appropriate to attach certified copies or pho-
tocopies of these contracts.
When shares are acquired pursuant to § 23(2)(2) GWB, the amount of the
shares acquired and the aggregate participation shall be stated (see § 23 (2)(2)
sentences 2 and 4 GWB for calculation of the aggregate participation). If the
merger is already consummated, then the date of consummation (ie., the date
when it was entered, as required, in the Commercial Register) shall be stated.
2. Information About the Enterprises
The information enumerated below shall not only be given for domestic
enterprises but also for foreign participating or linked enterprises.
* [1974] WuW 46; KB, Appendix V. For an alternate translation see COMPETITION LAW IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U. S. A., vol. A* at GER.L.III-I (D. Gjilstra & F. Murphy ed. 1977).
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2.1 The name of the firm (or other designation), the domicile (or the
place of establishment) and the type of business shall be stated for each indi-
vidual participating enterprise and for each individual enterprise linked with a
participating enterprise. In order to identify the type of business, state at least
the exact stage of business (ie., manufacturing, wholesaling) and the exact
field (not generally, such as "metal-working" but more specifically, such as
"manufacture of builder's hardware"); in every case it is appropriate to give a
complete report of the range of goods or services supplied by the enterprise.
2.2 Pursuant to § 23(5)(3) GWB, the following shall be submitted for
each individual participating enterprise, including the enterprises linked with
it:
2.2.1 The highest number of employees at any point in time during the
last completed business year before the merger (in the case of reports of con-
summated mergers under § 23(1) sentence 1 GWB) or within the last com-
pleted business year before the notification (in the case of notification of
merger plans under § 24a(l) sentences 1 and 2 GWB).
2.2.2 The turnover in the last completed business year before the merger
(in the case of reports of consummated mergers under § 23(1) sentence I
GWB) or in the last completed business year before the notification (in the
case of notification of merger plans under § 24a(l) sentences 1 and 2 GWB).
2.2.3 The market shares including the basis for their calculation or esti-
mation.
Hence, the number of employees, turnover and market shares must be
stated for each enterprise participating in the merger, including a collective
submission for the enterprises linked with it, but this need not be given sepa-
rately for each individual linked enterprise.
If all the participating enterprises taken together, including the enterprises
linked with them, do not fulfill one of the criteria of § 23(l)(1) or § 23(l)(2)
GWB (10,000 employees, DM 500 million turnover, 20% market share), then
the information under this criterion may be omitted for all enterprises. When
calculating market shares there may, in individual cases, be doubts regarding
the definition of the market (see no. 4 below). On this account, in the interest
of the completeness of reports and notifications, it is advisable to submit infor-
mation about market shares and market definition even if the 20% threshold is
not reached.
2.3 If a participating enterprise is linked with another participating en-
terprise, or with a third enterprise, then the relationships with the combine
(Konzern) and the control and shareholding relationships between the linked
enterprises shall be submitted.
B. Explanation of Particular Terms
The provisions on reports and notifications employ particular terms in a
precisely defined sense which is not always synonymous with that used in pro-
visions in other fields of law. This is especially true of the following terms:
1. Participating Enterprises
Which enterprises participate in a merger depends on how the merger is
concluded. Participants are, for example:
1.1 The firms merged with one another by way of amalgamation or
transformation;
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1.2 The acquiror in the case of the acquisition of shares, and the enter-
prise whose shares have been acquired;
1.3 The parties to the agreement in the case of agreements between en-
terprises within the meaning of § 23(2)(3) GWB;
1.4 The enterprises whose management bodies are occupied by the same
persons in the case of identity of persons in the management bodies under § 23
(2)(4) GWB;
1.5 The enterprises which are able to exercise a controlling influence
over another enterprise, and the enterprise controlled by this influence, in the
case of other types of links between enterprises within the meaning of § 23
(2)(5) GWB.
2. Linked Enterprises
This term does not coincide with the equivalent concept under the Stock
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz). Pursuant to § 23(1) sentence 2 GWB, the fol-
lowing are linked with a participating enterprise:
2.1 Enterprises which in relation to a participating enterprise are con-
trolled or controlling enterprises within the meaning of § 17 of the Stock Cor-
porations Act;
2.2 Enterprises which are combine enterprises (Konzernunternehmen)
within the same combine (Konzern) as a participating enterprise (§ 18 of the
Stock Corporation Act);
2.3 Enterprises over which the participating enterprise is able to exercise
a controlling influence jointly or with other enterprises by agreement or other-
wise;
2.4 Enterprises which are able to exercise a controlling influence, jointly
with other enterprises, by agreement or otherwise, over a participating enter-
prise.
3. Turnover (§ 23(1) sentences 3-6)
Calculation of turnover shall be based on § 158(1) and (2) of the Stock
Corporations Act. Value added tax and excise taxes shall not be included.
Foreign turnover shall also be included; turnover in foreign currencies shall be
converted into German marks at the official exchange rate. When submitting
information about the turnover of several linked enterprises, the receipts from
the supply of goods and services between them (internal sales) shall be ex-
cluded.
Insofar as the business operations of an enterprise consist of the distribu-
tion of goods (trade), only three-quarters of the turnover shall be taken into
account. Turnover does not exist in this sense if the goods produced or
processed by an enterprise are purchased and resold by another enterprise
linked with the first.
In the case of insurance companies, the premium income shall be substi-
tuted for turnover. This income shall be construed as the receipts from the
insurance and reinsurance business, including amounts ceded to reinsurers.
In the case of credit institutions and building and loan associations (Bau-
sparkassen), one-tenth of the balance sheet total shall be substituted for the
turnover. If information for several linked credit institutions or building and
loan associations is to be submitted, the balance sheet totals shall be reduced
by the amounts shown in the books as holdings in linked enterprises. If a
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statement should be made for the total turnover of a group of enterprises of
which, in addition to the other enterprises, a credit institution or a building
and loan association forms a part, then one-tenth of the balance sheet total of
the credit institution or building and loan association shall be added to the
other turnovers (§ 23 (1) sentence 4 GWB).
4. Market Shares
Calculation of market shares shall be derived from sales in the entire ter-
ritory in which this law applies (i e., the Federal Republic of Germany includ-
ing West Berlin). If an enterprise is not in business in the whole of the Federal
Republic or its market position shows considerable regional differences, then it
is necessary for information to be given for the market shares in individual
regional sales areas in addition to those for the Federal Republic.
The latest statistical information shall be used for the calculation of mar-
ket shares.
The calculation of market shares may be based on sales volume or value
of goods sold. It is appropriate to submit a calculation based on both of these
methods.
Only those goods or commercial services that are substitutable from the
point of view of the purchaser as regards their quality, use and price may be
considered substitutable. In the case of industrial products, the classification
system of the Systematic Index for Industrial Statistics (Systematisches
Verzeichnisfiir Industriestatistik) with its six- or seven-digit goods headings
may provide a point of reference. Frequently, however, heterogeneous prod-
ucts are condensed into one heading so that a further subclassification is neces-
sary. Regarding credit institutions, the breakdown of central bank
(Bundesbank) statistics, according to the individual lines of business, may be
taken as a basis for the purpose of defining markets. When calculating the
market shares to be stated, a rigorous subdivision of the markets will not
prejudice enterprises as regards the findings which will be made about posi-
tions of market dominance.
C. Legal Consequences
Any person who wilfully or negligently fails to file a report without undue
delay pursuant to § 23(l)-(5) GWB, or who submits false or incomplete infor-
mation, shall be judged to commit an offense under § 39(l)(2) GWB. This is
punishable by a fine of up to DM 50,000. The same applies in the case of false
or incomplete information submitted in a notification under § 24a(l) sentence
2 (§ 39(l)(3) GWB). In addition, a notification pursuant to § 24a(l) sentences
1 and 2 GWB shall not be considered to be effected if it fails to contain the
required complete information (§ 24a(l) sentence 4 GWB). The time limits
under § 24(2) sentence 2 and § 24a(2) GWB for the prohibition of a merger by
the Federal Cartel Office shall not begin to run.
Subject to review by the courts, the competent Decision Section of the
Federal Cartel Office shall decide upon the completeness of the information
submitted in a report or notification. The courts and the Decision Sections are
not bound by the considerations stated above. In the case of notifications pur-
suant to § 24a(l) sentences 1 and 2 GWB, it is advisable to seek an opinion
from the Decision Section as to its completeness prior to the submission of the
notification. In this manner, the participating enterprises obtain certainty that
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the merger may be prohibited only within a maximum period of four months
after submission of the notification (Exceptions: § 24a(2) sentence 2 GWB).
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APPENDIX III
Cartel Office Announcement: Domestic Effects of Mergers in the Context
of § 98(2) of the GWB
The protective purpose (Schutzzweck) of the respective applicable sub-
stantive provision of the law must be drawn upon in interpreting the meaning
of domestic effect under § 98(2) GWB (Ofeldrohre, July 12, 1973, 61 BGHZ
202; 25 BGHSt 208).
The purpose of §§ 23 GWB et seq. is to deal with concentration because it
can lessen competition. The term "restraint of competition" in § 98 (2) GWB
is the collective designation for all of the substantive rules of the GWB relat-
ing to restraints of competition. In view of §§ 23 GWB et seq., the restraint of
competition under § 98(2) GWB is the act of merging itself. Hence, it does not
matter whether the intensity of domestic competition is actually diminished as
a result of the merger.
A. Domestic effects under § 98(2) GWB are therefore present in any event if
the act of the merger occurs in Germany (i e., acquisition of the assets and
liabilities or the shares of a domestic enterprise, foundation of a domestic
joint venture-even if the purchasers or founders are foreign enterprises).
A merger occurring in a foreign country is deemed a merger between the
German subsidiaries of the participating enterprises (§ 23(3), sentence 4
GWB).
B. Mergers occurring in aforeign country have domestic effects if the struc-
tural preconditions for domestic competition will be influenced by the
merger, and at least one domestic enterprise (even subsidiaries or other
linked enterprises) participates.
1. For mergers occurring in a foreign country between only two directly
particaflting enterprises (all acts 6f the merger with the exception of
the creation ofjoint ventures-! e., acquisition of the assets and liabil-
ities or the shares of a foreign enterprise by a domestic enterprises):
a) domestic effects are present if both enterprises were already active
in the domestic market before the merger directly or via subsidi-
aries, permanent establishments or importers;
b) domestic effects may be present if only one enterprise was active
in the German market before the merger, but for instance:
aa) after the merger it is likely that one of the foreign partici-
pants will import supplies into Germany on the basis of
technical production (pre- or post-production steps) or
product line relationships. The likelihood of future supply
to the domestic market usually depends on whether similar
or like products are already an object of trade between the
participating states and no technical or administrative barri-
ers stand in the way;
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bb) as a result of the merger the know-how of a domestic enter-
prise will be perceptibly increased or industrial property
rights are available to it.
2. For theformation ofjoint ventures in a foreign country, domestic effect
depends primarily on the production and geographic activities of the
joint venture. Whether domestic effects are present in this case is gov-
erned in view of the activities of the joint venture by the principles enu-
merated under B(I), whereby the production techniques and/or product
line relations are to be judged by the relationship between the joint ven-
ture and the domestic participants.
Further, the formation of a joint venture in a foreign country may
also have domestic effects if-
a) one of the foreign enterprises participating in the joint venture was
active domestically beforehand in the joint venture's field of activity
or it is likely with sufficient probability that it would become active
domestically without the joint venture (ef. B(l)(aa));
b) the domestic enterprise participating in the joint venture increases
its production capacity via the joint venture to an extent that
thereby the available capacity for domestic supply is perceptibly
changed (substitution of domestic export production by export pro-
duction in foreign countries). The requirement for perceptibility
here is usually that the domestic participant held a strong market
position before the merger.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:371(1979)
APPENDIX IV
Cartel Office Merger Inquiry Letter (English translation and German
original)
FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE 1000 BERLIN 61
Mehringdamm 129
(am Platz der Luftbriucke)
Telephone (030) 69 01-1
Re: U.S.A. corporate acquisition
of F.R.G. GmbH
Dear Sir:
Your enterprise is obligated under § 23(4) GWB to report this merger to
the Federal Cartel Office if the enterprises participating in it collectively had
world wide turnover of at least DM 500 million and/or had a market share of
at least 20 % in a domestic market in the last business year before the merger
(§ 23(1), sentence 1 GWB). To the extent a participating enterprise is a con-
trolled or controlling enterprise under § 23(1), sentence 2 GWB, all controlling
or controlled enterprises are to be considered as a single enterprise for pur-
poses of computing market share and turnover. As a rule the Federal Cartel
Office uses a participation of at least 50% as the basis for an enterprise link in
this sense. It is therefore requested that you provide the following informa-
tion-separately for each participating enterprise-as required under § 23(5)
GWB:
- Name, place of business and type of business,
- linked enterprises,
- domestic market shares (to the extent the participating enterprises in-
cluding linked enterprises together reach at least 20%),
- number of employees,
- level of turnover.
Further, market shares, number of employees and turnover are to be sub-
mitted collectively for the enterprises linked to the enterprises participating in
the merger.
If the acquired enterprise had a turnover of less than DM 50 million, then
it is requested that the turnover of the seller also be reported for purposes of
considering the minimum size criterion (§ 24(8)(2) GWB).
The following applies to the calculation of turnover: Turnover in foreign
currencies is to be computed according to the official exchange rate into Ger-
man marks. In place of turnover for credit institutions and building and loan
associations, one tenth of the total assets, and with respect to insurance compa-
nies, the premium income are to be substituted for turnover; three-fourths of
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the turnover of businesses engaged in the distribution of goods and 20 times
the turnover of publishing enterprises are to be provided.
If you can not provide full information for the other participating enter-
prises, please provide their addresses.
BUNDESKARTELLAMT 1000 BERLIN 61
Mehringdamm 129
(am Platz der Luftbrucke)




Ihr Unternehmen ist nach § 23 Abs. 4 GWB verpflichtet, diesen Zusam-
menschluss beim Bundeskartellamt anzuzeigen, wenn die hieran beteiligten
Untemehmen insgesamt im letzten vor dem Zusammenschluss endenden Ges-
chaftsjahr weltweit Umsatzerlse von mindestens 500 Mio DM bzw. im Inland
auf einem Markt Anteile von mindestens 20 % hatten (§ 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1
GWB). Soweit ein beteiligtes Unter nehmen ein abhingiges oder herr-
schendes Unternehmen im Sinne von § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GWB ist, sind ftr die
Berechnung der Marktanteile und der Umsatzerlse alle herrschenden und
abhangigen Unternehmen als einheitliches Untemehmen anzusehen. Das
Bundeskartellamt geht bei einer Beteiligung von mindestens 50% in der Regel
von einem Unternehmensverbund in diesem Sinne aus. Ich bitte Sie daher-
getrennt fur jedes beteiligte Unternehmen-um die folgenden nach § 23 Abs.
5 GWB erforderlichen Angaben:
- Firma, Sitz und Art des Geschaftsbetriebes
- verbundene Unternehmen
- Marktanteile im Inland (soweit die Beteiligten einschliesslich der
verbundenen Unternebmen zusammen mindestens 20 % erreichen)
- Zahl der Beschdftigten
- Hohe der Umsatzerlose
Marktanteile, Beschaftigtenzahl und Umsatzerlse sind ferner zusam-
mengefasst fur die mit den Beteiligten verbundenen Unternebmen anzugeben.
Hatte das erworbene Untemehmen Umsdtze von weniger als 50 Mio DM, so
bitte ich, zur Prtifung des Anschlusstatbestandes (§ 24 Abs. 8 Nr. 2 GWB)
auch die Umsatzerlose des Verausserers mitzuteilen.
Fffr die Berechnung der Umsatze gilt folgendes: Erlose in fremder Wahrung
sind nach dem amtlichen Kurs in Deutsche Mark umzurechnen. An die Stelle
der Umsatzerl~se treten bei Kreditinstituten und Bausparkassen ein Zehntel
der Bilanzsumme, bei Versicherungsunternehmen die Primieneinnahmen;
Handelsumsatze sind mit drei Viertelen, Presseumsatze mit dem
Zwanzigfachen in Ansatz zu bringen.
Sofem Sie fiber die anderen beteiligten Unternehmen keine vollstandigen An-
gaben machen konnen, bitte ich um deren Anschriften.
